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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction over this appeal 
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated §78-2-2 (3)(j) and Rule 3(a) of 
the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. The Utah Supreme Court, 
acting pursuant to Rule 42 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Proce-
dure, and Utah Code Annotated § 78-2-2(4) transferred this appeal 
to this Court by order dated August 31, 199 2. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW AND STANDARD OF 
APPELLATE REVIEW 
The issues presented in this appeal are as follows: 
1. Whether the District Court correctly determined that 
title to the property conveyed by Jacksons by Warranty Deed to 
Mostrongs on or about September 1, 1987, was marketable? 
Standard of Review: This issue presents a mixed question of 
fact and law. As Mostrongs have challenged all of the District 
Court's findings of fact and conclusions of law, those findings 
supported by the record that title to the property conveyed by 
Jacksons to Mostrongs was marketable is reviewable under the 
clearly erroneous standard. Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a); Matter of 
Estate of Bartell, 776 P. 2d 885, 886 (Utah 1989). Whether the 
District Court properly concluded that title to the property 
conveyed by Jacksons by Warranty Deed to Mostrongs was marketable 
is reviewable under the correction of error standard. Marchant 
v. Park City, 771 P.2d 677 (Utah App. 1989). 
2. Whether the District Court correctly determined that 
legal access from the property to a public road was represented 
by the Jacksons to be along the lane running north from said 
property and whether Mostrongs have failed to sustain their 
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burden of proof to support their claim that Jacksons represented 
that there was legal access over the lane running south of the 
property? 
Standard of Review: This issue presents a question of fact 
and is reviewable under the clearly erroneous standard,, Utah R. 
Civ. P. 52(a); Matter of Estate of Bartell, 776 P.2d 885, 886 
(Utah 1989) . 
3. Whether the District Court correctly determined that 
Jacksons did not make any fraudulent oi negligent misrepresenta-
tions to Mostrongs regarding access to the property? 
Standard of Review: This issue presents a mixed question of 
fact and law. Those findings supported by the record that 
Jacksons did not make any fraudulent or negligent misrepre-
sentations regarding access to the property is reviewable under 
a clearly erroneous standard. Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a); Matter of 
Estate of Bartell, 776 P. 2d 885, 886 (Utah 1989). Whether the 
District Court properly concluded that Jacksons did not make any 
fraudulent or negligent misrepresentations regarding access to 
the property is reviewable under a correctness of error standard. 
Marchant v. Park City, 771 P.2d 677 (Utah App. 1989). 
4. Whether the District Court correctly determined that 
Jacksons did not make any fraudulent or negligent misrepresenta-
tions regarding the condition of the home? 
Standard of Review: This issue presents a mixed question of 
fact and law. Those findings supported by the record that 
Jacksons did not make any fraudulent or negligent misrepre-
sentations regarding the condition of the home is reviewable 
under a clearly erroneous standard. Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a); 
Matter of Estate of Bartell, 776 P.2d 885, 886 (Utah 1989). 
Whether the District Court properly concluded that Jacksons did 
not make any fraudulent or negligent misrepresentations regarding 
the condition of the home is reviewable under a correctness of 
error standard. Marchant v. Park City, 771 P.2d 677 (Utah App. 
1989) . 
5. Whether the District Court correctly determined that 
there was no material mutual mistake of the parties or that there 
was no material unilateral mistake on the part of Mostrongs 
regarding access to the property or construction of the home? 
Standard of Review: This issue presents a mixed question of 
fact and law. Those findings supported by the record that there 
was no material mutual mistake of the parties or material 
unilateral mistake on the part of Mostrongs is reviewable under 
a clearly erroneous standard. Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a); Matter of 
Estate of Bartell, 776 P. 2d 885, 886 (Utah 1989). Whether the 
District Court properly concluded that there was no material 
mutual mistake of the parties or material unilateral mistake on 
the part of Mostrongs is reviewable under a correctness of error 
standard. Marchant v. Park City, 771 P.2d 677 (Utah App. 1989). 
6. Whether the District Court correctly determined that 
bank refinancing for the money owed to Jacksons under the Note 
and Trust Deed was reasonably available to Mostrongs had they 
pursued the matter further, particularly in view of Jacksons' 
willingness to pay for the construction deficiencies noted by the 
Millard county Building Official and the lending institution 
appraisers? 
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Standard of Review: This issue presents a question of fact 
and is reviewable under a clearly erroneous standard. Utah R. 
Civ. P. 52(a); Matter of Estate of Bartell, 776 P.2d 885, 886 
(Utah 1989) . 
7. Whether the District Court correctly determined that 
any rights which Mostrongs may have had to rescission under any 
stated facts were waived by Mostrongs' failure to promptly notify 
Jacksons of Mostrongs' intention to rescind the contract and by 
Mostrongs' failure to tender back the property upon Mostrongs 
learning of the lack of legal access over the south lane and upon 
learning of alleged deficiencies in the construction of the house 
located on the property? 
Standard of Review: This issue presents a mixed question of 
fact and law. Those findings supported by the record that 
Mostrongs waived their right to rescission is reviewable under a 
clearly erroneous standard. Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a); Matter of 
Estate of Bartell, 776 P.2d 885, 886 (Utah 1989). To the extent 
that the trial court properly concluded that Mostrongs waived any 
rights they may have had to rescission is reviewable under a 
correctness of error standard. Marchant v. Park City, 771 P.2d 
677 (Utah App. 1989) . 
DISPOSITIVE STATUTES 
There are no constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances 
or regulations whose interpretations are dispositive of the 
issues presented in this appeal. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings, and Disposition in 
the Court Below 
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Mostrongs (Appellants) commenced this action in the Fourth 
Judicial District Court of Millard County, State of Utah, on 
September 17, 1990, (R. 1-9), alleging fraud, misrepresentation, 
negligent misrepresentation, breach of contract and mistake in 
the purchase of real property located in Millard County, Utah. 
Jacksons (Respondents) filed a counter claim for damages and 
attorneys' fees. 
A bench trial was held October 28 and 29, 1991, and December 
9, 1991, with the Honorable Cullen Y. Christensen, District 
Judge, presiding. Judgment was entered on January 23, 1992, (R. 
542) dismissing all claims of Mostrongs' complaint "no cause of 
action." Jacksons' counter-claim was also dismissed "no cause of 
action." Mostrongs and Jacksons were each ordered to assume 
their own costs of Court and attorneys' fees. Mostrongs filed 
this appeal. 
Statement of the Facts 
1. On or about October 26, 197 8, LeeRoy Jackson and his 
brother, William Jackson, purchased real property ("property") 
located near Fillmore, Utah from a Mrs. Geraldine Kessler. At 
the time of their purchase, Jacksons obtained title insurance on 
the property from Security Title Company of Fillmore, Utah. 
(T.276:25;T.277:1-71; Ex. 38, Finding No. 2, R. 534). 
2. Mrs. Kessler originally owned a large, undivided tract 
of land that included the property sold to William and LeeRoy 
References to the Transcript of the trial shall be desig-
nated T. : . The number preceding the colon indicates the page 
being referenced and the number or numbers following the colon 
indicate the line or lines being cited. 
5 
Jackson. The property LeeRoy and William Jackson purchased from 
Mrs. Kessler represents the first lot conveyed from said tract. 
3. The property lies approximately 3/4 of a mile south of 
a public highway. (T.348:22-25,T.349:1-9; Ex. 51). The lane 
running from the highway to the property was the only available 
access when Jacksons purchased the Property. (T.277:8-25,T.278:1-
2,7-13). After purchasing the Property, Jacksons continuously 
used the north lane for access as an easement. (T.278:7-12,T.382: 
19-25,T.383:1-7) . 
4. Mrs. Kessler subsequently conveyed tracts located 
north of the Jacksons" property, with language contained in each 
deed, stating: "TOGETHER WITH AND SUBJECT TO a 33 foot easement 
over and across the East 33 feet of said property for road and 
utility purposes." (emphasis in original)(T.350:6-24; Ex. 51). 
5. On November 4, 1979, a Warranty Deed was recorded 
conveying the property from William Jackson and LeeRoy Jackson to 
LeeRoy Jackson and Margaret Jackson (Ex. 39). At that time, the 
north lane provided the only access to the property. (T.277: 8-
25,T.278:1-5) . No one ever contested the right of Jacksons or 
Mostrongs to use the north lane for access to the property. 
(T.335:16-24; Finding No. 3, R. 534). 
6. In approximately July, 1979, Jacksons constructed a 
home on the property. (T.278:22-24). When Jacksons constructed 
the home, there were no building codes in effect in Millard 
County. The Uniform Building Code ("UBC") was not adopted by 
Millard County until March, 1981 (Ex. 42). Millard County 
nonetheless issued Jacksons a building permit on July 18, 1979 
that provided that construction must conform "to all ordinances 
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in Millard County, laws for the State of Utah, the Uniform 
Building Code and all rules and decisions of the Building 
Inspector"(emphasis added). No final occupancy permit was sought 
by Jacksons upon completion of the home due to the fact that 
there was no Building Inspector employed by Millard County at 
that time.(T.225:2-17,T.244:9-15; Finding Nos. 4, 5,R. 533-534). 
7. In 1979 Jacksons obtained verbal permission from Hal 
Burdick, the owner of land adjoining the property on the south, 
to construct a lane across the Burdick land to a county road, a 
distance of approximately 1/4 of a mile. (T.237:6-13,T.278:17-
21). Jacksons graded this south lane and applied a cinder base. 
Mr. Burdick subsequently sold his land to Ralph G. Tuckfield. 
Jacksons never discussed this lane with Mr. Tuckfield but 
continued to use the same without objection. (T.238:3-17, T.278: 
14-16). Jacksons used the south lane as their primary access, 
but also used the north lane for access to the property. (T.246: 
6-16; Finding No. 6, R. 533). 
8. Larry Mostrong offered LeeRoy Jackson $55,000.00 for 
the property, but LeeRoy Jackson specifically said he would not 
sell the property for less than $65,000.00. Mostrongs agreed to 
pay $65,000.00 for the property. (T.63:12-20,T.112:7-22; Finding 
Nos. 7, 8, R. 532-533) . 
9. Prior to signing the Earnest Money Agreement (Ex. 1) 
Larry Mostrong inspected the property on several occasions. The 
parties agree that the north lane and south lane were discussed 
on these occasions. (T.133:7-15). Mostrongs testified that 
Jacksons represented that the north lane was available, but the 
south lane was the primary access, that such lane would be there 
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"always" and that the south lane was a private road which 
Mostrongs would have to maintain. Jacksons testified that 
Mostrongs were told that the north lane was the legal access to 
the property and that the south lane was for convenience only and 
was only a permissive use. (T.280:22-25,T.281:1-3, Finding No. 9, 
R. 532). 
10. Mostrongs and Jacksons signed an integrated Earnest 
Money Agreement on or about July 15, 1987 for a total purchase 
price of $65,000.00. (T.63:24-25,T.64:1-2; Ex. 1; Finding No. 10, 
R. 532). 
11. Two appraisals were performed on the property after 
the Earnest Money Agreement was signed but before the September 
1, 1987 closing. Neither appraisal identified any problems 
concerning access to the property or the condition of the 
property. (Ex. 2A, 2B; Finding No. 11, R. 532). 
12. At approximately the same time the parties signed the 
Earnest Money Agreement, Mostrongs applied for a conventional 
loan through Zions First National Bank. (T.64:3-12; Ex. 2). 
Mostrongs could not pay the required down payment for a conven-
tional loan through Zions First National Bank, so on or about 
August 4, 1987 they made application through Zions First National 
Bank for FHA Financing. (T. 29:1-4; Ex. 2; Finding No. 12, R. 531). 
13. On August 28, 1987, Zions First National Bank, the 
parent company of Zions Mortgage Company, denied Mostrongs' 
application for credit due to insufficient verification of income 
and because Mr. Mostrong was self-employed and had not resided in 
Utah for a sufficient time to establish his income. (T.28:8-20; 
Ex. 2). However, Zions First National Bank specifically informed 
8 
Mostrongs that the bank would be willing to loan Mostrongs money 
to purchase the property after they established a stable income 
over a two-year period. (Finding No. 13, R. 531). Specifically, 
Mr. Mostrong had to establish a two-year income requirement in 
Utah to receive financing. (T.153:2-19) . 
14. Both parties still wanted to complete the sale, 
Jacksons stated they would carry the financing for two years to 
allow Mostrongs to establish a sufficient income history and 
residency in Utah. (T.32:7-12). The parties closed the sale of 
the property on September 1, 1987 as memorialized by a Warranty 
Deed from Jacksons to Mostrongs and a Trust Deed Note and a Deed 
of Trust in favor of Jacksons (Ex. 4). Mostrongs took possession 
of the property. (Finding No. 14, R. 530-531). 
15. At the closing, Jacksons conveyed by Warranty Deed and 
Mostrongs accepted only the property described in said Warranty 
Deed. The Warranty Deed did not specifically include any 
easement for access from the north or the south. (Ex. 4; Finding 
No. 15, R. 530). Larry Mostrong testified that he repeatedly 
asked LeeRoy Jackson about access to the property, showing his 
concern regarding the access issue. (T.133:10-15). Nevertheless, 
Larry Mostrong testified that he had read legal descriptions in 
the past and that he had the opportunity to read the legal 
description on the Warranty Deed he received from Jacksons at 
closing. When asked if it bothered him that it did not specifi-
cally call out the easements, he replied, "I didn't read it in 
detail". (T.161:1-9). Furthermore, Jennifer Mostrong testified 
that she either saw or signed the documents at closing. (T.33:4-
12) . 
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16. Upon purchasing the property, Mostrongs obtained a 
policy of title insurance on the property from Security Title 
Company of Millard County ("Security Title"). The policy insured 
access to the property (Ex. 14; Finding No. 16, R. 530). The 
policy also specifically insured against unmarketability of title 
(Ex. 14). The manager of Security Title, Mostrongs' agent, 
testified that he knew there was no "recorded easement", but felt 
there was an implied easement due to the work he had done on the 
property and the intention that there was an implied easement to 
the north. (A.[Abstract of Transcript] 7:18-25fA.8:1-11). 
17. All parties reasonably believed at closing that the 
only apparent obstacle to bank financing was the two-year 
residency for verification of Mostrongs' income. (T.30:9-17). 
When asked why he agreed to seller financing with the Mostrongs, 
LeeRoy Jackson's unrebutted testimony was that Larry Mostrong 
said he had sufficient money in a California bank and may cash 
Jacksons out in six months, that he would be receiving a sizeable 
amount of money on an upcoming construction job, and that he 
would pay off the debt within six months to a year. (T.282:23-
25,T.283:1-8) . The parties therefore agreed to seller financing 
to give Mostrongs time to accomplish the intended FHA or other 
financing as an interim measure.(Finding No. 17, R. 529). 
18. From September 1, 1987, the date Mostrongs signed said 
Trust Deed Note, until shortly before such Note became due on 
September 1, 1989, Mostrongs never made further application for 
financing. (T.72:7-13). At various times during this two-year 
period, Larry Mostrong worked and lived in California. (T.73:21-
25,T.74:1-7,T.149:13-25,T.150:1-17; Finding No. 18, R. 529). 
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19. On or about September 1, 1989, Jennifer Mostrong 
informed Jacksons that she had made application for an FHA Loan 
through First Security Bank, which loan was expected to be 
finalized within four (4) to six (6) weeks. As a result, 
Jacksons granted Mostrongs an additional three (3) months in 
which to get the FHA financing. (T.284:6-19; Finding No. 19, R. 
529). 
20. Mostrongs thereafter informed Jacksons that FHA had 
denied their loan request because of a question regarding an 
easement to the property. Mostrongs said they needed a "recorded 
easement" to the property. (T.285:3-15, A.[Abstract of Tran-
script] 10 :5-ll; Finding No. 20, R. 529). 
21. Security Title secured a Warranty Deed for the said 
north lane from Geraldine Kessler (prior owner of the servient 
property) to Jacksons, Jacksons in turn deeded the easement to 
Mostrongs. (T. 285:3-15). Both deeds were recorded on January 4, 
1990. (Exs. 37, 38; Finding No. 21, R. 528-529). Mostrongs 
accepted the easement and remained in possession of the property 
until approximately September 25, 1990. 
22. On December 1, 1989, Jacksons filed a Notice of 
Default on the Trust Deed because Mostrongs had failed to make 
the balloon payment due on September 1, 1989. (Ex. 10; Finding 
No. 22, R. 528). 
23. Mostrongs continued their efforts to obtain bank 
financing. On or about February 12, 1990 Jacksons offered to 
carry the financing until March 1, 1990 upon certain conditions 
(Ex. 36). Mostrongs declined to accept such conditions. (T.286: 
7-17; Finding No. 23, R. 528). 
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24. A Trustee's Sale under the Trust Deed was scheduled 
for April 4, 1990. On or about March 28, 1990, Mostrongs 
attempted to procure a temporary restraining order against said 
sale. On or about April 4, 1990, the parties, through their 
respective counsel, negotiated an extension of said Trustee's 
Sale to May 18, 1990. (T.78:9-14). On or about May 17, 1990, 
Mostrongs paid to Jacksons the sum of $5,257.37 for back monthly 
payments agreed upon for Mostrongs to have continued possession 
of the property and for attorneys' fees, costs and trustee's fees 
and Jacksons extended the time for the Trustee's Sale for an 
additional sixty days. (Ex. 27, 28; Finding No. 24, R. 528). All 
of the continuations of the Trustee's Sales, were made at the 
request of Mostrongs or Mostrongs' legal counsel. (T.271:12-24 ) . 
25. During the interim, Mostrongs negotiated with Valley 
Central Bank for a loan to pay off Jacksons' Trust Deed. Valley 
Central Bank approved the loan, conditioned upon dedication of 
the south lane as a Millard County road and correction of certain 
deficiencies in construction of the house on the property. 
(T.119: 9-21; Ex. 18, Finding No. 26, R. 527). The construction 
deficiencies were noted by Joseph Stott, an FHA fee appraiser, 
who testified that if the deficiencies listed in his appraisal 
were corrected, he could see no other problems with the house. 
(T.125:21-25,T.126:1-2). 
26. On or about May 3, 1990, Mostrongs obtained a deed 
from the owner of the property on which the south access to the 
property is located, with delivery conditioned upon acceptance of 
said lane as a county road. (Ex. 22; Finding No. 26, R. 527; 
T.79:9-11). 
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27. On or about May 15, 1990, Mostrongs received a 
commitment from the Millard County Commission that Millard County 
would accept the south lane as a county road and would agree to 
maintain "this new and improved county road" (Exs. 32, 33)- The 
Millard County Attorney took a position that such acceptance was 
conditioned upon the lane being brought to county standards, (Ex. 
20, 21) but the said County Commission resolution did not so 
specifically state (Ex. 32, 33). The County Commission chose not 
to follow the County Attorney's advise. (T.252:5-13). Mostrongs' 
position that conditions were imposed upon them by the County 
Commission before acceptance of the road is contrary to the 
evidence (Ex. 32, 33) and contradicts the testimony of their 
former legal counsel who testified at trial. (T. 272:16-25,T.273: 
11-20,T.274:1-10,15-24 ) . The Millard County Superintendent of 
Roads, Lee Roper, testified that he was not contacted by 
Mostrongs (T.208: 1-9) to ascertain what, if any, improvements 
were necessary to bring the lane to county standards. The 
Jacksons refused to contribute in any amount towards such costs. 
Nevertheless, Mostrongs submitted the letter of commitment from 
Millard County to Valley Central Bank in support of their loan 
application. (T.83:19-20; Finding No. 27, R. 527). 
28. Lee Roper further testified that he is not aware of 
any county "standards" for the road (T.205:25,T.206:1-10) and 
that Millard County had accepted and has quite a few unimproved 
roads in the area. (T.208:10-13). 
29. At Jacksons' request, the Millard County Building 
Official, Jerry Reagan, made an inspection of the home to look at 
the structural integrity and give his overall impression of the 
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home. (T.228:2-11; Ex. 19). Mr. Reagan testified that he used 
the 1979 Uniform Building Code ("UBC") as a guide. He further 
testified that the home "looked good" with the exceptions he 
noted. However, the UBC had not been adopted by Millard County 
at the time the home was built. (T.228:21-25,T.229:1-2; Finding 
No. 28, R. 526, 527). 
30. Carl Faulkner, a licensed contractor, called by 
Mostrongs testified that it would cost $6,085.00 to correct the 
deficiencies as noted by Mr. Reagan's inspection, and that the 
same could be corrected within a couple of days. Butch Jensen, 
a licensed contractor, called by Jacksons, testified that it 
would cost $3,212.00 to make the noted repairs (Ex. 47) and that 
the same could be done in less than a week. Jacksons twice 
offered to pay for the cost of fixing any such construction 
deficiencies (Exs. 34, 35;), but no affirmative response was 
received from the Mostrongs with respect thereto. (Finding No. 
28, R. 526). 
31. After the deed for easement over the south lane and 
the commitment from Millard County to accept the same as a county 
road were received, and after Jacksons' offers to pay for the 
noted deficiencies in the construction of the house, Mostrongs 
took no further steps to secure bank or FHA financing in order to 
pay off the Trust Deed Note. (Finding No. 29, R. 526). Jacksons 
delayed foreclosure for approximately thirteen months from the 
date the Note became due. 
32. Mostrongs made no further payments on the said Trust 
Deed Note after May 17, 1990, but remained in possession of the 
property. (T.290:17-20). The property was sold at Trustee's Sale 
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on September 25, 1990; Jacksons entered a bid at said sale of 
$42,000-00, which bid was accepted. A Trustee's Deed was issued 
to Jacksons on September 27, 1990. (Ex. 10D; Finding No. 31, R. 
525) . 
33. Mostrongs vacated the property on September 25, 1990. 
(T.290:12-20) . Mostrongs did not tender the property back to 
Jacksons prior to that date, nor did Mostrongs notify the 
Jacksons of any intent to repudiate or rescind the purchase of 
the property. (T.100:6-19,T.164:23-25,T.165:1-4; Finding No. 32, 
R. 525). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
POINT I: The terms of the Earnest Money Agreement required 
Jacksons to convey marketable title as evidenced by a current 
policy of title insurance in the amount of the purchase price or 
by an abstract of title brought current, with an attorneys' 
opinion. Security Title issued Mostrongs a policy of title 
insurance covering the purchase price of the property. Such 
policy of title insurance insured against lack of right-of-access 
to and from the property or unmarketability of title. 
Under the facts presented and the Case Law in support 
thereof, the court properly concluded that the property conveyed 
by Jacksons to Mostrongs was marketable. 
POINT II: Conveyance of financible property was not a 
condition precedent under the contract terms. The underlying 
premise of entering into the contract was that Mostrongs would 
establish a two-year residency and income verification in Utah. 
The fact that Zions First National Bank informed Mostrongs that 
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they would loan Mostrongs the money after the two-year residency/ 
income requirement shows that the property was financible. 
The record is clear that financing was not denied based on 
the claims asserted by Mostrongs that there was "lack of access" 
to the property and violations of UBC standards regarding the 
home. Financing was initially denied by FHA due to the fact that 
the property was not on a public road and due to collection 
action. Financing was initially denied by Valley Central Bank 
due to inquiries made of four minor construction deficiencies and 
due to collection action. 
POINT III; Jacksons always represented legal access to the 
property from the north lane. Jackson originally had an easement 
by implication from the property to said north lane and Security 
Title agreed. Mostrongs have not sustained their burden of proof 
to support their claim that Jacksons represented that there was 
legal access over the lane running south from the property. 
Furthermore, Mostrongs voluntarily obtained an easement on the 
south lane which was accepted unconditionally by the Millard 
County Commission as a public road. 
POINT IV: Mostrongs have not established by "clear and 
convincing evidence" that Jacksons made fraudulent or negligent 
misrepresentations regarding access to the property and have 
failed to establish the elements of fraudulent or negligent 
misrepresentation. Furthermore, Mostrongs had actual and 
constructive notice that the south lane did not have an easement 
and Mostrongs were therefore chargeable with notice of all 
conditions, exceptions or reservations appearing in their chain 
of title. 
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POINT V: Mostrongs have not established by "clear and 
convincing evidence" that Jacksons made fraudulent or negligent 
misrepresentations regarding the condition of the home. At the 
time the home was built in 1979, Millard County had not yet 
adopted the UBC. No final occupancy permit was sought by 
Jacksons when they completed the home as there was no building 
inspector employed by Millard County at such time. Mostrongs 
lived in the home approximately three years without raising any 
concerns regarding structural deficiencies. 
POINT VI: The District Court correctly determined that 
there was no material mutual mistake of the parties. 
The evidence does not establish that both parties were aware 
of a clear bona fide mistake regarding material facts as to 
access or regarding material facts as to the construction of the 
home. Mostrongs have not proven the elements of mutual mistake. 
POINT VII: The District Court correctly determined that 
there was no material unilateral mistake on the part of the 
Mostrongs to support a rescission of the contract of the parties. 
Mostrongs fail to carry their burden to establish that there was 
a material unilateral mistake on their part. Furthermore, 
Mostrongs have failed to establish the elements of unilateral 
mistake. Mostrongs have failed to marshal the evidence and 
establish that the trial court's determination was clearly 
erroneous. 
POINT VIII: The District Court's determination that bank 
refinancing for the money owed to Jacksons under the Note and 
Trust Deed was reasonably available to the Mostrongs had they 
pursued the matter further, particularly in view of Jacksons' 
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willingness to pay for the construction deficiencies noted by the 
Millard County Building Official and the lending institution 
appraisers, was not clearly erroneous. The two problems that 
allegedly prohibited Mostrongs from obtaining financing on the 
property were 1) having the south lane dedicated as a county road 
and 2) correcting four or five minor construction deficiencies 
noted by the Valley Central Bank appraiser. 
The Millard County Commission unconditionally accepted the 
south lane as a county road. The Jacksons, also unequivocally 
represented to the Mostrongs on two occasions that they would pay 
for any of the construction deficiencies impeding Mostrongs' 
ability to obtain financing from Valley Central Bank. Although 
both of these issues were resolved, Mostrongs never responded to 
Jacksons' request to help, nor did they apply for financing once 
the apparent impediments were removed. 
POINT IX: The District Court correctly determined that any 
rights which Mostrongs may have had to rescission under any 
stated facts were waived by Mostrongs failure to promptly notify 
Jacksons of Mostrongs' intention to rescind the contract and by 
Mostrongs' failure to tender back the property upon Mostrongs 
learning of the lack of legal access over the south lane and upon 
learning of alleged deficiencies in the construction of the house 
located on the property. 
Mostrongs retained possession of the property for approxi-
mately three years without issuing any complaints as to the 
structural integrity of the home, voluntarily procured an 
easement over the south lane, and requested several continuances 
of Trustee's Sales in order to proceed with financing. Mostrongs 
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never attempted to rescind the contract nor did they tender the 
property back to the Jacksons. Mostrongs' representations and 
conduct are inconsistent with their claim for rescission. 
POINT X: The District Court correctly determined that 
neither party has shown a legal basis to support a claim for 
attorneys' fees. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY DETERMINED THAT TITLE TO THE 
PROPERTY CONVEYED BY JACKSONS BY WARRANTY DEED TO MOSTRONGS 
ON OR ABOUT SEPTEMBER 1, 1987, WAS MARKETABLE. 
Mostrongs' assertion that Jacksons did not convey marketable 
title is against the clear weight of evidence produced at trial. 
The parties entered into an arms length transaction, whereby 
Mostrongs agreed to purchase the property for $65,000.00. 
(T.63:15-20,T.64:23-25,T.65:1-12; Finding No. 8, R. 532). On July 
15, 1987, the parties entered into an integrated Earnest Money 
Agreement reciting the $65,000.00 purchase price. 
Mostrongs were informed by Zions First National Bank that 
they could not obtain long-term financing on the basis that Larry 
Mostrong was self-employed and had not resided in Utah for a 
sufficient time to establish his income. Jacksons agreed to 
carry the financing on the property for two years to allow the 
Mostrongs to establish a sufficient income history and residency 
in Utah so as to satisfy the bank's lending requirements for 
financing. (T.32:7-12). 
Therefore, the parties entered into an Earnest Money 
Agreement on July 15, 1987, for the sale and purchase of the 
property. On September 1, 1987, the parties held a closing 
memorialized by a Warranty Deed, a Trust Deed Note and a Trust 
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Deed. (Finding No. 14, R. 530, 531). Security Title conducted 
the closing. Jacksons conveyed by Warranty Deed and Mostrongs 
accepted only that property described as follows: 
The South half of the Southwest quarter of the North-
east quarter of the Southeast quarter of Section 22, 
Township 21 South, Range 5 West, Salt Lake Base and 
Meridian. 
Excepting therefrom k of all oil, gas and other 
minerals in on or under said land, together with the 
right of ingress and egress for the purpose of explor-
ing and/or removing the same. 
Together with that certain underground water well 
identified as: Water User's Claim No. 67-885, Applica-
tion No. 5342, Certificate No. 12844. 
Together with all improvements and appurtenances 
thereunto belonging. 
Subject to covenants, conditions, restrictions, 
reservations, rights of way and easements in existence 
and/or of record.(emphasis added) 
Said conveyance did not specifically include any easement 
for access from the north or the south. (Ex. 4; Finding No. 15, 
R. 530). 
Paragraph 3 of the Earnest Money Agreement entitled 
"Condition and Conveyance of Title" states in pertinent part: 
Seller agrees to furnish good and marketable 
title to the property, subject to encumbrances and 
exceptions noted herein, evidenced by a current policy 
of title insurance in the amount of the purchase price 
[or]2 an abstract of title brought current, with an 
attorney's opinion...(Addendum A) 
Security Title issued to Mostrongs and Mostrongs accepted a 
policy of title insurance covering the purchase price of the 
2The Earnest Money Agreement contains a space with an 
accompanying box • located prior to seller's choice of conveying 
marketable title, evidenced by a policy of title insurance or an 
abstract of title. Jacksons conveyed marketable title, evidenced 
by a policy of title insurance. 
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property. (Ex. 14; Addendum B). The cover sheet of the Policy of 
Title Insurance states in pertinent part: 
...[F]irst American Title Insurance Company a 
California Corporation, herein called the Company, 
insures, as of Date of Policy shown in Schedule A, 
against loss or damage, not exceeding the amount of 
insurance stated in Schedule A, and costs, attorneys' 
fees and expenses which the Company may become obli-
gated to pay hereunder, sustained or incurred by the 
Insured by reason of: 
1. Title to the Estate or Interest de-
scribed in Schedule A being vested other-
wise than is stated herein; 
2. Any defect in or lien or encumbrance 
of such title; 
3. Lack of a right-of-access to and from 
the land; or 
4. Unmarketability of such title. 
(empha sis added) 
It is well established that: 
" . . .marketable title must be free from reasonable 
doubt...[T]he test is not whether title ultimately 
might be adjudged free of defects. Rather, it is 
"whether a reasonable prudent [person], familiar with 
the facts and apprised of the question of law involved, 
would accept the title in the ordinary course of 
business." Brown v. Yacht Club of Coeur D'Alene, Ltd., 
Ill Idaho 195, 722 P.2d 1062, 1065, (1986) and that "to 
render a title unmarketable, the defect must present a 
real and substantial probability of litigation or loss. 
Frank Towers Corp. v. Laviana, 97 A.2d 567, 571 (1953). 
The trial court could determine that Jacksons conveyed 
marketable title to Mostrongs, based on the findings and the 
record that Mostrongs inspected the property on several occasions 
prior to entering into the Earnest Money Agreement (T.133:7-9); 
that Mostrongs accepted the property pursuant to the terms of the 
Earnest Money Agreement; that Mostrongs received a policy of 
title insurance that insured against "lack of a right-of-access 
to and from the land" and "unmarketability of title"; and that 
Larry Mostrong was familiar with legal descriptions and read the 
legal description on the Warranty Deed he received from Jacksons 
21 
at closing. (T.160:1-9). Furthermore, it is reasonable that a 
person who was told he could obtain bank financing on the 
property after establishing a two-year residency/income require-
ment would purchase the property. 
Jurisdictions under similar facts as those presented to the 
trial court, have made a distinction as to the manner in which 
the seller's conveyance of marketable title is deemed sufficient. 
In Holmby, Inc. v. Pino, 647 P. 2d 392 (1982) the Supreme 
Court of Nevada considered whether the encumbrance on the 
property evidenced by a Trust Deed, which was made known to the 
buyer after execution of a sales document, disabled the seller 
from conveying marketable title. In refusing to grant the buyer 
specific performance, the Court stated that..."[T]here was 
undisputed evidence that Dino [seller] would have been able to 
tender marketable title. The sales agreement provided that a 
Title Insurance Policy would serve as evidence of marketable 
title." Holmby, Inc. v. Pino, 647 P.2d 392, 394 (1982)(emphasis 
added). Courts in other jurisdictions which have addressed this 
issue have also similarly held. See e.g. , Love v. Fetters, 121 A. 
607 Court of Errors and Appeals of New Jersey (1923); Korb v. 
Spray Beach Hotel Co,, 24 N.J. Super. 151, 93 A.2d 578, 581 
(1952) . 
Under these facts the trial court properly concluded that 
the property conveyed by Jacksons to Mostrongs was marketable. 
II. CONVEYANCE OF "FINANCIBLE" PROPERTY WAS NOT A CONDITION 
PRECEDENT UNDER THE CONTRACT TERMS. NEVERTHELESS, THE 
EVIDENCE IS CLEAR THAT THE PROPERTY CONVEYED FROM JACKSONS 
TO MOSTRONGS WAS "FINANCIBLE". 
A. Conveyance Of Financible Property Was Not A Condition 
Precedent To The Contract. 
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Mostrongs' allegations that the underlying premise of the 
parties' contract was that the property was financible and 
therefore was a condition precedent to Mostrongs' contractual 
obligations, is without merit. In fact, the trial court 
specifically found that: 
[a]11 parties reasonably believed at the time of 
closing that the only apparent obstacle to bank 
financing was the two-year residency for verification 
of Plaintiffs' income. The parties therefore agreed in 
order to give Plaintiffs time to accomplish the 
intended FHA or other acceptable financing to enter 
into said Note and Trust Deed as an interim mea-
sure, (rinding No. 17, R. 529-530) 
The underlying premise of entering into the contract was not 
that the property was financible, but that the Mostrongs would 
establish a two-year residency and income verification in the 
State of Utah. (Finding No. 13, R. 531). This is further estab-
lished by the testimony given by the parties in this action. 
(T.28:8-20,T.30:9-17,T.313:9-15). Zions First National Bank 
would have financed the property but for Larry Mostrong's failure 
to establish a sufficient income history in Utah (T.71:8-19; 
Finding No. 13, R. 531) this shows the property was both 
marketable and financible. 
Finally, neither the Earnest Money Agreement (Ex. 1; 
Addendum A) , nor the Trust Deed Note (Ex. 4) impose any condition 
precedent regarding "financibility" of the property. This is 
further borne out by the testimony of LeeRoy Jackson. (T.282:7-
15,T.283:l-8,T.312:13-25,T.313:l-8). 
B. The Financial Institutions Did Not Deny Mostrongs 
Financing Due To "Lack Of Access" To The Property, Or 
For Failure to Comply With UBC Standards Regarding The 
Home'8 Construction, 
23 
Mostrongs' assertion that the record is clear that Jacksons 
did not convey financible title [property] is without merit. 
Mostrongs failed to cite any part of the record in support of 
such assertion, but only suggest that financing was denied 
because of lack of access to the property and that the home's 
construction was substandard. 
1. Access; 
FHA's denial of Mostrongs' loan application (Ex. 7) does not 
say financing was denied because of "lack of access", it was 
denied due to the fact that it was not located on a "public 
maintained road". This was confirmed by both Linda Whiteman, 
First Security Bank Loan Officer and an FHA appraiser Steve 
Hatch. (A.29:24-25,A.33:12-16,A.34:4-7,T.213:21-25,T.214:1-3). 
Furthermore, it is interesting to note that there is no 
similar requirement for a conventional loan.3 This was made 
clear by Steve Hatch, who conducted two appraisals on the 
property. After referring to the requirement that the property 
must be located on a public road for FHA purposes, Steve Hatch 
testified that for conventional loan purposes "...it's not up to 
me to reject or not reject it as far as that conventional loan." 
(T.213:21-24,T.214:1-5) . 
That the alleged access problem was not even a consideration 
when Mostrongs applied for conventional financing through Valley 
Central Bank, is evidenced by the testimony of Judy Hardinger, 
Loan Officer of Valley Central Bank. (A.41:12-25,A.42:1-6). 
3Mostrongs' argument assumes FHA was the only financing 
available. This is contrary to the terms of the Earnest Money 
Agreement. The only other application made by Mostrongs to 
Valley Central Bank was a conventional loan. 
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2. UBC Standards: 
Mostrongs second assertion that the property was "non-
financible" is based on the allegation that the home's construc-
tion was not in compliance with UBC standards. Again, Mostrongs 
fail to cite to the record to support such allegation. In fact, 
no where in the entire record has it been established that 
Mostrongs were denied financing due to the home being constructed 
in violation of the UBC. 
FHA denied Mostrongs' loan application for two reasons: 1) 
the property was not on a public road (A. 33:12-16) and 2) for 
collection action (Ex. 7). Construction deficiencies were not 
even raised by FHA. In fact, Steve Hatch testified that he saw 
no structural problems with the house that would make FHA reject 
the loan application. (T.219:21-25,T.220:1-8). 
Valley Central Bank also denied Mostrongs' loan application 
for two reasons: 1) inquiries made of four minor construction 
deficiencies (Ex. 18) and 2) collection action (Ex. 17). 
Loan Officer Judy Hardinger testified that the only reason 
the loan application was denied was based on appraiser Joseph 
Stott's references to construction deficiencies. (A.41:6-18, 
A.49:5-11,A.47:21-25,A.48:1-4). Furthermore, Judy Hardinger 
testified that the question regarding access to the property was 
not an issue. (A.41:25,A.42:1-6). 
Joseph Stott, who conducted an appraisal for Valley Central 
Bank, testified that he uses UBC standards and standards set by 
FHA when inspecting a home, and that he is familiar enough with 
those standards to make a judgment call as to the construction of 
a home. (T.124:12-15,T.122:7-16). When asked whether Jacksons or 
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Mostrongs would have to bring up the noted deficiencies to UBC 
standards, Stott testified: 
What the lenders ask us to do is go out and to 
indicate any deficiencies or problems in the home, and 
we put that on the appraisal. And when that lender or 
underwriter reviews that, they can require that those 
be brought up to those standards, if they so desire, 
(emphasis added)(T.124:16-23). 
Steve Hatch's testimony is consistent. When asked if every 
home he inspected had to meet building code inspection, Hatch 
testified: 
No. If it's something obvious and merely defi-
cient of course appraisers aren't inspectors per se, we 
are for value; but there's most houses in our county, 
community, whatever, financed somewhere and obviously 
the older ones may not meet the most up-to-date codes 
but still, if they are reasonably accepted market, they 
are in fact financed. (T.220:17-25). 
It is also interesting to note that the collection matters 
raised by Valley Central Bank, were taken care of by Mostrongs 
approximately two months after Mostrongs' loan had been denied. 
(A.46:22-25,A.47:1-14; Ex. 29, 31). Mostrongs did not return to 
apply for financing with Valley Central Bank after correcting 
those concerns raised (A.48:2-4), even though a determination for 
financing could have been made in less than a month. (A.48:5-12). 
Mostrongs have failed to marshal the evidence in support of 
their allegation that the property was not financible. Doelle v. 
Bradley, 124 Utah Adv. Rep. 20, 21 (1989), and that the findings 
of the trial court were "clearly erroneous". Utah R. Civ. P. 
52(a). 
III. THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY DETERMINED THAT LEGAL ACCESS 
FROM THE PROPERTY TO A PUBLIC ROAD WAS REPRESENTED BY THE 
JACKSONS TO BE ALONG THE LANE RUNNING NORTH FROM SAID 
PROPERTY AND MOSTRONGS HAVE NOT SUSTAINED THEIR BURDEN OF 
PROOF TO SUPPORT THEIR CLAIM THAT JACKSONS REPRESENTED THAT 
26 
THERE WAS LEGAL ACCESS OVER THE LANE RUNNING SOUTH FROM THE 
PROPERTY. 
The testimony clearly establishes that Jacksons represented 
legal access to the property to the lane running north to a 
public road, while consistently representing the south road to be 
built by permission and use for convenience only.4 (T.281:2-
7,T.245:4-9,T.239:2-9,T.240:12-25,T.241:1-2). At no time did 
Mostrongs testify that Jacksons represented to have an "easement" 
on the south road. 
A. At the Time Jacksons Purchased The Property# The Only 
Access To The Property Was Over The North Lane 
Connecting Jacksons' Property To A County Road; 
Jacksons Initially Had An Easement By Implication When 
They Purchased The Property, And Later Acquired A 
"Recorded Easement" To Said North Lane. 
Prior to Mrs. Geraldine Kessler selling LeeRoy and William 
Jackson the property at issue, Mrs. Kessler owned the entire 
tract of land including Jacksons' property, located approximately 
3/4 of a mile north to a public road. (A.15:5-25). LeeRoy and 
AThe District Court determined in Finding No. 9, R. 532, 
that the evidence did not preponderate in support of Mostrongs' 
claim with respect to the south lane. Mostrongs cite portions of 
the transcript to establish that LeeRoy Jackson's testimony was 
contradictory on this point; that Jackson testified that he told 
Larry Mostrong that he had a legal easement to the south road 
(T.245) and then denied that he told him that he had an easement 
on that road. (T.280-281). However, when reading the entire 
portion of the transcript cited by Mostrongs, LeeRoy Jackson 
immediately clarified his statement regarding an easement to the 
south lane. Jackson testifies that "I told them I had put the 
road in, I had permission to use the road for convenience". (See 
T.281:2-7;T.245:4-9 ) In at least five separate incidents LeeRoy 
Jackson testified that he built the south lane by permission of 
the previous landowner and used the property for "private use", 
or "personal use only" (emphasis added) (See T.239:2-9;T.240:12-
19 Citing Jackson Deposition T.240: 23-25;T.241:1-2;T.245:4-
9;T.281:2-7) Nowhere in the trial transcript have Mostrongs 
testified themselves that LeeRoy Jackson represented to them that 
he had an "easement" on the south road. The great weight of 
evidence supports the trial court's finding. 
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William Jackson were the first purchasers of a lot located within 
said tract of land. 
In Ovard v. Cannon, 600 P.2d 1246 (1979), the Supreme Court 
set forth the elements of an easement by implication as follows: 
1) A previous unity of title; 2) followed by a sever-
ance; 3) that at the time of the severance the servitude was 
so plainly apparent that any prudent observer should have 
been aware of it; 4) that the easement is reasonably 
necessary to the use and enjoyment of the dominant estate; 
and 5) it must have been continuous, at least in the sense 
that it is used by the possessor whenever he desires. 
Such an easement would run to the benefit of Jacksons upon 
conveyance of the property. 
It has been established that there was a previous unity of 
title by Mrs. Kessler (A.15:5-25); followed by a severance -
Jacksons being the first to purchase a parcel of the undivided 
tract (Ex. 50). Furthermore, when Mrs. Kessler sold said 
property to Jacksons, the road was plainly apparent to anyone who 
would have observed or made an inspection of the property. As 
the road was the only access to the Jacksons' property, the 
easement was not only reasonably necessary, but was imperative to 
the use and enjoyment of the dominant estate and the use of said 
road was continuous by Jacksons, as it was the only access to 
their property. 
The Vice-President and Manager of Security Title, Kent 
Dalton, testified that he felt that there was an easement at law 
or an implied easement to the property, based on work he had 
previously done on said property; and that "it was the intention 
that there was an implied easement to the north". (A.8:4-11). In 
any event, once Security Title recorded said Warranty Deeds for 
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an easement to the north lane (Exs. 37, 41), it effectively cured 
any question regarding the "recorded easement" requested by FHA. 
Regardless of whether Jacksons had an easement by implica-
tion, it has been shown that Mrs. Kessler conveyed the property 
to the individual property owners "TOGETHER WITH AND SUBJECT TO 
a 33 foot easement over and across the east 33 feet of said 
property for road and utility purposes".(emphasis in the 
original) (Addendum C; Ex. 51). The law is well established in 
this State that "if a conveyance contains a reservation, the 
entire property or estate described passes to the grantee, 
subject to the right, estate or easement reserved..••" (emphasis 
added) Burton v. United States, 29 Utah 2d 226, 507 P.2d 710, 712 
(Utah 1973). Furthermore, Utah Courts have recognized the 
principle that "'In construing instruments creating easements in 
land, the Court will look to the circumstances attending the 
transaction, situation of the parties, the state of thing 
granted, and the object to be obtained, to ascertain and give 
effect to the intention of the parties'". Stevens v. Bird-Jex 
Co. , 18 P.2d 292, 294 (Utah 1933)(Citing Kirkham v. Sharp, 1 
Whart. (Pa.) 323, 29 an. dec. 59; Green v. Canny, 137 Mass. 64; 
Adney v. Twonbly, 39 R.I. 304, 97 A. 806; Thomson v. Germania L. 
Ins. Co., 97 Minn. 89, 106 N.W. 102). 
The Stevens Court indicated that there was nothing in the 
language of the deed "...to indicate an intention that the 
grantee was to have the exclusive use of the property over which 
the easement was created".Stevens, Id.. In the Stevens case, the 
Court refused to consider the issue as to whether the rights of 
the servient owner would be subordinate to those of the dominant 
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owner, due to the fact that the owners of the dominant estate 
".•.have not in any manner been hindered or obstructed in the 
enjoyment of the easement..." (Stevens, 292 at 295). 
Mostrongs' argued that the District Court did not address 
the issue of whether the deeds purporting to grant an easement 
over the north lane successfully conveyed this easement. This is 
contrary to the testimony and evidence presented at trial. 
After all of the deeds from Kessler to the various property 
owners north of the Jackson property were submitted, the trial 
court specifically asked Mostrongs expert witness, Wayne M. 
Pinder, Jr., owner and president of Provo Land Title Company, 
whether all the deeds contained the language "subject to a right-
of-way" . Mr. Pinder responded, "They do". (T.350:6-9). In 
clarification of this issue, the trial court a second time asked 
Mr. Pinder whether "all the deeds [are up the chain or] up the 
lane contain the language 'together with and subject to a right-
of-way'". Again the witness testified, "Right." (T.350:22-25 ) . 
The Court also pointed out that no one had ever prevented 
the Jacksons or the Mostrongs from travelling over the north lane 
to get to the public road. (T.335:16-21) . Finally, Mostrongs' 
argument regarding the insurability of the Warranty Deed 
easements (Ex. 37, 41) is misplaced. The District Court aptly 
points out that Security Title had already issued Mostrongs a 
policy of title insurance insuring against lack of access to the 
property. (T.334:10-25,T.335:1-7). 
Again, Mostrongs have failed to marshal the evidence in 
support of the District Court's findings and demonstrate that the 
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evidence supporting the findings is "clearly erroneous". Utah R. 
Civ. P. 52(a). 
B. Mostrongs Have Not Sustained Their Burden Of Proof To 
Support Their Claim That The Lane Running South Of The 
Property Was The Barqained-For Access, 
In support of its findings, the District Court determined 
that 1) Larry Mostrong inspected the property on at least three 
occasions prior to entering into the Earnest Money Agreement and 
that the parties agreed that the north lane and south lane were 
discussed on these occasions (Finding No. 9, R. 532); 2) the 
parties had further discussions on those occasions when they 
talked about the access road and maintenance of the access road 
(T.133:7-15); 3) Mostrongs informed Jacksons that they 
[Mostrongs] needed a "deeded" easement over the north lane 
(T.285:3-7); 4) when Mostrongs made inquiry to Jacksons regarding 
a "recorded easement" to the north lane, Jacksons contacted 
Security Title Company, who secured a Warranty Deed easements for 
the north lane from Geraldine Kessler, (prior owner of the 
servient property) which deeds were recorded on January 4, 1990 
in the Millard County Recorder's Office. (Finding No. 21, R. 528, 
529; Ex. 37, 41); and 5) Jacksons testified that they informed 
Mostrongs that the north lane was the legal access to the 
property and that the south lane was for convenience only and was 
only a permissive use. (T.280:22-25,T.281:1-3; Finding No. 9, R. 
532) . 
Mostrongs have failed to marshal the evidence in support of 
their assertion that the south lane was the bargained-for 
property. Such finding is not clearly erroneous. Utah R. Civ. P. 
52(a). 
31 
C. Mostrongs Voluntarily Obtained An Easement On The 
South Lane, 
A series of continuances of the pending Trustee's Sale on 
the property were made in order to give Mostrongs additional time 
to obtain an easement on the south lane in furtherance of 
financing. (T.85:8-22,T.78:9-17; Finding No. 24, R. 528). The 
record shows that such continuances were made at the request of 
Mostrongs. (T.275:4-16). 
Accordingly, Mostrongs obtained an easement on the south 
lane at no cost. (T. 79:4-11). The easement given by a Mr. 
Tuckfield to the Mostrongs was accompanied by a letter making 
conveyance of the easement conditional on Millard County's 
acceptance of the south lane as a public road (Ex. 22). Millard 
County accepted the road outright, without attaching any 
conditions to such acceptance (Exs. 32, 33). Thereafter, 
Mostrongs' previous attorney gave the easement to the Millard 
County Attorney, who held the deed awaiting instructions to 
record same. (T.250:12-17 ) . When Mostrongs failed to request 
recordation of the deed, it was returned to Mostrongs' current 
attorney. At this particular point in time, Mostrongs could 
easily have obtained financing through FHA. 
1. Mostrongs Allegations That The Cost Associated 
With Millard County Accepting Said South Lane 
Was Prohibitive, Is Against the Credible Weight 
Of Evidence. 
Mostrongs make allegations, unsupported by the record, and 
against the great weight of evidence, that the Millard County 
Commission imposed "conditions" in accepting the south lane as a 
county road. 
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Jennifer Mostrong testified that Millard County would only 
accept the south lane if brought up to county standards. (T.79: 
12-25,T.80:1-5). This is contrary to the testimony of Mostrongs' 
former attorney, who testified that no conditions were imposed. 
(T.272:16-25,T.273:1-25,T.274:1-25). It is also contrary to the 
County Commission Resolution (Finding No. 27, R. 527; Ex. 42) and 
contrary to an official letter delivered to Mostrongs by the 
Millard County Commission, whereby Millard County agreed to 
accept and maintain the road to the property as a county road. 
(T.81:19-25,T.82:1-25,T.83:1-9; Ex. 32). 
Jennifer Mostrong further testified that she contacted Lee 
Roper, Millard County Road Supervisor, to determine county 
specifications for the south lane (T. 80:13-24) and that she 
thereafter contacted Reed Penney, general contractor, for a 
quote. (T.80:25,T.81:1-2).5 Larry Mostrong further testified 
that he had to install a cattle guard and culvert at an 
exorbitant expense, in order to meet the county road standards. 
However, when asked who told him that county standards warranted 
the installation of a cattle guard and culvert, Larry Mostrong 
testified that M[n]obody told me to do it." (T.165:12-16). 
Millard County Road Supervisor, Lee Roper, emphatically 
denied ever talking to Jennifer Mostrong or Reed Penney. 
(T.208:1-9). Furthermore, Lee Roper's testimony was unrebutted 
that he has no documentation that shows "standards" for a county 
road that the Millard County Commission would accept (T.205:25, 
3Reed Penney testified that he could not remember who he 
talked to to obtain the specs from the County as it was "three or 
four years ago". (T.204:20-25) He further testified that he did 
not inspect the road prior to entering his bid. (T.205:1-4) 
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T.206:1-9) and that Millard County has accepted and has quite a 
few similar unimproved roads in the area. (T.208:10-13). 
Finally, Lee Roper testified that he does not know anything about 
having to install cattle guards. (T.209:8-10). 
Mostrongs' allegations that the south lane was the 
"bargained-for" access to the property is inconsistent with their 
conduct in obtaining an easement over the south property. 
Mostrongs never testified that Jacksons represented to them 
that they had an "easement" on the south road. Furthermore, 
Jacksons never retracted their position that the south road was 
built by permission for their use and convenience and that they 
were not obligated to seek an easement on the south road (Ex.15). 
The evidence is unrebutted that Jacksons made several 
continuances of the Trustee's Sale at Mostrongs' request to allow 
the Mostrongs the opportunity to obtain said easement to the 
south lane. (T.78:9-12,T.271:12-24,T.286:18-22). 
IV. THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY DETERMINED THAT JACKSONS DID 
NOT MAKE ANY FRAUDULENT OR NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATIONS TO 
MOSTRONGS REGARDING ACCESS TO THE PROPERTY, AND SUCH FINDING 
IS NOT CLEARLY ERRONEOUS. 
The District Court correctly determined that Jacksons did 
not make fraudulent or negligent misrepresentations to Mostrongs 
regarding access to the property. Mostrongs have not met their 
burden, either before the trial court or on appeal that Jacksons 
made fraudulent or negligent misrepresentations. Such proof is 
to be established by "clear and convincing evidence". Modern Air 
Conditioning, Inc. v. Cinderella Homes, Inc., 226 Kan. 70, 596 
P.2d 816, 824 (1979) . 
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A. Mostrongs Have Not Established the Elements of Fraudu-
lent Or Negligent Misrepresentation Regarding Access 
To The Property. 
Mostrongs have failed to marshal the evidence to establish 
that Jacksons made fraudulent or negligent misrepresentations 
regarding access to the property. 
This Court has defined the elements of fraud as follows: 
(1) That a representation was made; 
(2) Concerning a presently existing material fact; 
(3) Which was false; 
(4) Which the representor either 
a) Knew to be false, or 
b) Made recklessly, knowing that he had insufficient 
knowledge upon which to base such representation; 
(5) For the purpose of inducing the other party to act 
upon it; 
(6) That the other party, acting reasonably and in igno-
rance of its falsity, 
(7) Did in fact rely upon it; 
(8) And was thereby induced to act; 
(9) To his injury or damage. 
Wright v. Westside Nursery, 787 P. 2d 508, 512 (Utah Ct. App. 
1990WCiting Pace v. Parrish, 122 Utah 141, 144-145, 247 P.2d 273 
(1952). 
In arguing against the findings of the trial court and 
attempting to show that the elements of fraudulent and negligent 
misrepresentation exist, Mostrongs fail to cite to the record to 
support their claims against the trial court's findings. 
Mostrongs reargue the facts most favorable to their position and 
ignore the District Court's findings supported by the record. 
In their Brief, Mostrongs fail to address elements 2, 3, 7 
and 8 in the aforementioned definition of fraud. 
The only arguments advanced by Mostrongs are 1) that the 
factual findings of the trial court indicate that Jacksons 
represented to Mostrongs that the north lane was the legal access 
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to the property and the south lane was a private road which was 
permissibly used and which would be there always. In addition, 
Mostrongs state that LeeRoy Jackson told Larry Mostrong that he 
had a legal easement to the south road (See fn.4) and that the 
construction of the house was FHA approved. 
Larry Mostrong testified that LeeRoy Jackson stated that the 
construction of the home was "FHA approvable" and then contra-
dicted himself stating that LeeRoy Jackson represented construc-
tion of the house was "FHA approved", (T.151:6-12). LeeRoy 
Jackson testified that he represented to Mostrongs that he had 
built the home himself and that he made no other representations 
regarding the construction of the home. (T.280:15-20) . 
In response to Mostrongs' argument that Jacksons induced the 
Mostrongs to purchase the property, the trial court found that 
Larry Mostrong initially offered LeeRoy Jackson $55,000.00 for 
the property but that LeeRoy Jackson specifically informed Larry 
Mostrong that he would not sell the property for less than 
$65,000.00 and that Mostrongs thereafter agreed to pay the 
$65,000.00 purchase price. (Finding No. 8, R. 532). 
All other arguments made by Mostrongs as to Jacksons' 
alleged fraudulent or negligent misrepresentations were addressed 
and disposed of earlier, with the exception of the issue 
regarding the condition of the home which will be addressed 
hereafter. 
Finally, in response to Mostrongs' assertion that the 
court's reliance on certain testimony proffered by Jacksons to 
support their [Jacksons'] contention that they made no material 
misrepresentation of fact is misplaced (Appellants' Brief P. 37). 
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Mostrongs, not Jacksons, must prove such fraud or negligent 
misrepresentation by "clear and convincing evidence". Modern Air 
Conditioning, Inc., at 816, 824. 
B. Mostrongs Had Actual and Constructive Notice That The 
South Lane Did Not Have An Easement And Were Therefore 
Chargeable With Notice Of All Conditions. Exceptions 
or Reservations Appearing In Their Chain Of Title, 
The record establishes that Mostrongs had previously 
purchased other properties besides the property in issue. 
(T.157:6-11,T.34:7-19). When asked if he had previous opportuni-
ties to read legal descriptions, Larry Mostrong answered "Yes." 
(T.161:1-3) Apparently, Larry Mostrong was extremely concerned 
regarding the access to the property (T.133:7-15) and testified 
that on the day of closing he had opportunity to read the 
description on the warranty deed he received from the Jacksons. 
In light of the aforementioned facts, Mostrongs took no 
further action to ascertain the status of an easement to the 
south road. 
The law is well established that M'[a] purchaser is not only 
charged with notice of the contents of the deeds of his chain of 
title but, if the same contain anything that would put a prudent 
man upon inquiry, he is chargeable with notice of whatever an 
inquiry would reveal.'" Haves v. Gibbs, 169 P.2d 781, 784 (Utah 
1946)(Citing Wilkerson v. Ward, Tex. Civ. App., 137 S.W. 158). 
Mostrongs knew from the language of the Warranty Deed, which 
they claim to have read at closing (T.161:1-6,T.33:4-12), that 
the Warranty Deed did not specifically call out an easement to 
the south lane. Mostrongs are charged with notice of "the 
contents" of the deeds of their chain of title, and as such, 
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Mostrongs could have ascertained that there was not a legal 
easement south of the property. 
V. THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY DETERMINED THAT JACKSONS DID NOT 
MAKE ANY FRAUDULENT OR NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATIONS TO 
MOSTRONGS REGARDING THE CONDITION OF THE HOME AND SUCH 
FINDING IS NOT CLEARLY ERRONEOUS. 
Mostrongs only allegations that Jacksons fraudulently or 
negligently misrepresented the condition of the home were based 
on Larry Mostrong's testimony that LeeRoy Jackson represented 
that the house construction was FHA approved and that since 
LeeRoy Jackson built the home he knew or should have known that 
the house did not conform to UBC standards. 
As with Mostrongs previous argument that Jacksons fraudu-
lently and negligently misrepresented the issue regarding access 
to the property, Mostrongs have failed to marshal the evidence 
and cite the record supporting their claims. 
When Jacksons constructed the home on said property in 1979, 
the UBC was not in effect in Millard County. The UBC was not 
adopted by Millard County until March of 1981 (Ex. 42). On July 
18, 1979, a building permit was issued by Millard County to 
Jacksons. No final occupancy permit was sought by the Jacksons 
upon completion of the home as there was no building inspector 
employed by Millard County at such time. (T.225:1-25,T.244:9-15; 
Finding No. 5, R. 533). 
Jacksons construction of the home could not have conformed 
to the UBC for the simple fact that the UBC requires a final 
inspection and issuance of a final occupancy permit. As 
established at trial, Jacksons could get neither, as Millard 
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County had not as of that date employed a building inspector. 
(T.225:2-25). 
As further pointed out above, Larry Mostrong's testimony 
that LeeRoy Jackson represented the home to be FHA approvable 
(T.151:6-10) is antithetical to LeeRoy Jackson's testimony that 
the only representation he made was that he had actually 
constructed the house. (T.280:15-20). 
Larry Mostrong testified that he inspected the home prior to 
purchase (T.151:4-5); that he signed an Earnest Money Agreement 
accepting the home in its present physical condition (T.151:21-
25,T.152:1-5) ; and that he did not enlist the help of a building 
inspector prior to purchase. (T.152:6-9). 
Nevertheless, Mostrongs resided in the home for approxi-
mately three years without any apparent difficulties with the 
structure or improvements. 
The cases cited by Appellants in support of this argument 
are inapposite. (Appellants' Brief P. 30). In each such case the 
prospective buyer was denied financing for "insufficient income". 
Mostrongs have not established fraudulent or negligent 
misrepresentation by "clear and convincing evidence". Modern Air 
Conditioning, Inc., at 816, 824. 
VI. MOSTRONGS HAVE FAILED TO ESTABLISH THAT THERE WAS A MATERIAL 
MUTUAL MISTAKE OF THE PARTIES REGARDING ACCESS TO THE 
PROPERTY OR CONSTRUCTION OF THE HOME. 
Mutual mistake requires that "...there is a clear bona fide 
mistake regarding material facts, without culpable negligence on 
the part of the person complaining...." Davie v. Brownson, 3 
Wash. App. 820, 478 P. 2d 258, 260 (1970) (Citing Lindberq v. 
Murray, 177 Wash. 43, 201 P.2d 759, 763 (1921)). 
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A party claiming mutual mistake must show that the mistake 
involved a "material fact" and "without culpable negligence" on 
the part of the person complaining. Davie, at 260. 
The trial court determined that "[N]o material mutual 
mistake of the parties has been shown by the evidence adduced by 
[Mostrongs]." (Conclusion No. 8, R. 523) 
Mostrongs suggest that there were clear bona fide mistakes 
regarding material facts as they related to access to the 
property and construction of the property. The issue regarding 
access has been addressed. The District Court found sufficient 
evidence to establish that there was proper legal access to the 
north lane. Furthermore, Mostrongs had possession of the 
property for approximately three years and obtained an easement 
to the south lane. 
Mostrongs assertion that there were mutual mistakes of fact 
regarding construction of the home, has no merit. Financing was 
never denied because the home did not comply with UBC standards, 
it was denied because the FHA appraiser, Joseph Stott, was 
concerned about three or four construction items on the property. 
(T.119:5-16; Ex. 18). Mr. Stott testified that in jurisdictions 
that had not adopted building codes, FHA has its own standards. 
Mr. Stott further testified that had the items he checked on his 
appraisal been corrected, there was nothing else he saw that 
would have been a problem. (T.125:2-25,T.126:1-2 ) • 
There was no material mutual mistake of the parties that the 
home was built strictly in accordance with the UBC, due to the 
fact that such alleged noncompliance with the UBC had absolutely 
no bearing on Mostrongs' ability to obtain financing. In June of 
40 
1991, Mostrongs hired a building inspector, Charles V. Hugo, and 
a contractor, Carl Faulkner, to inspect the property and estimate 
costs of construction problems.6 (T.177:17-23). When asked which 
UBC manual he used during his inspection of the home, Mr. Hugo 
testified, "I didn't have a manual in my hand. I was going by 
past experience as an inspector and looking for, not necessarily 
code violations, but problems." (T.181:2-10) . Mostrongs raised 
the issue regarding the UBC, after the fact, only in furtherance 
of their lawsuit. 
It may be expected that homes that are constructed in a 
jurisdiction that have not adopted the UBC may well have some 
construction deficiencies. However, Steve Hatch, a real estate 
appraiser with 22 years experience (T.211:4-18), when asked 
whether all homes he inspects would have to meet the UBC, 
testified, "No...obviously the older ones may not meet the most 
up-to-date codes but still, if they are reasonably accepted 
market/ they are in fact financed."(emphasis added)(T.220:17-25). 
Mostrongs did not meet their burden in trial court that 
there was a material mutual mistake of the parties, nor have they 
marshaled the evidence on this appeal to challenge the Court's 
determination. It is well established that: 
6Timely objection (T.186:9-12) was made on the grounds of 
relevancy on Mr Hugo's and Mr. Faulkner's testimony based on the 
fact that financing was not denied on account of the UBC 
violations and that the cost of correcting the items set forth in 
such inspection exceeded the cost of those items addressed by 
Valley Central Bank as listed in the Stott Appraisal. (Ex. 18) 
Furthermore, Faulkner's estimate of corrections was approximately 
twice the amount testified to by Butch Jensen. Faulkner 
testified that he did not have experience as a building inspec-
tor, but that he took a "punch list" evaluating what he felt were 
inadequacies with regard to the home. (T.195:10-23) 
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[t]he Appellant must marshal all the evidence 
which supports the trial court's findings and show 
that, in the light most favorable to the finding, it is 
against the "clear weight of the evidence", and is thus 
clearly erroneous when applied to the foregoing legal 
principles. 
Grahn v. Gregory, 800 P.2d 320, 327 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
VII. THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY DETERMINED THAT MOSTRONGS HAVE 
FAILED TO ESTABLISH THAT THERE WAS A MATERIAL UNILATERAL 
MISTAKE ON THEIR PART TO SUPPORT A RESCISSION OF THE 
CONTRACT BETWEEN THE PARTIES. 
Utah Courts have defined unilateral mistake as consisting of 
the following elements: 
1) The mistake must be of so grave a consequence that to 
enforce the contract as actually made would 
unconscionable. 
2) The matter as to which the mistake was made must 
relate to a material feature of the contract. 
3) Generally the mistake must have occurred notwithstand-
ing the exercise of ordinary diligence by the party 
making the mistake. 
4) It must be possible to give relief by way of rescis-
sion without serious prejudice to the other party 
except the loss of his bargain. In other words, it 
must be possible to put him in status quo. 
Mostrongs have not established that there was a mistake of 
"so grave a consequence" that to enforce the contract as actually 
made would be unconscionable, nor have Mostrongs established that 
there was a mistake of a "material" feature of the contract. 
The contract entered into by the parties was that Mostrongs 
would receive financing to pay off the Note at the end of two 
years. Financing was never denied because of "lack of legal 
access" and "structural defects of the house", as alleged by 
Mostrongs. 
The evidence has been established that there was legal 
access to the north lane and that the Mostrongs were on notice as 
to legal access to the south lane. It has also been shown that 
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the construction of the home had no bearing on Mostrongs' ability 
to obtain financing. 
Finally, Jacksons would be seriously prejudiced by a 
rescission of the contract, based on the extended time they gave 
Mostrongs to obtain financing, Mostrongs' continuous occupation 
of the property, Jacksons' lost rent and subsequent expenses in 
restoring the property. 
It is evident from the arguments made above, that there was 
not a material mistake regarding financing, lack of access or 
material structural defects of the home. 
Mostrongs do nothing more than re-argue the case as 
presented at the trial court. It is not Jacksons' place to 
marshal the evidence to support the Court's finding and conclu-
sion that there was no material unilateral mistake on the part of 
Mostrongs sufficient to support a rescission. 
VIII. THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY DETERMINED THAT BANK 
REFINANCING FOR MONEY OWED TO JACKSONS UNDER THE NOTE 
AND TRUST DEED WAS REASONABLY AVAILABLE TO MOSTRONGS 
HAD THEY PURSUED THE MATTER FURTHER, PARTICULARLY IN 
VIEW OF JACKSONS' WILLINGNESS TO PAY FOR THE CONSTRUC-
TION DEFICIENCIES NOTED BY THE MILLARD COUNTY BUILDING 
OFFICIAL AND THE LENDING INSTITUTION APPRAISERS. 
A. Mostrongs' Acquisition Of An Easement Over The South 
Lane Of The Property And Jacksons' Willingness To 
Correct The Construction Deficiencies, Guaranteed 
Mostrongs Financing. 
The trial court found that the Mostrongs submitted the 
Millard County commitment to Valley Central Bank in support of 
their loan application and testimony is unrebutted that access 
was no longer an issue to financing. (T.41:25/T.42:1-11). 
It has been shown that Valley Central Bank's refusal to 
accept the loan application was due to those construction 
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deficiencies noted on Joseph Stott's appraisal. It has been 
established that the UBC was not in existence in Millard County 
when Jacksons constructed the home and that neither Mostrongs or 
Jacksons were required to conform the home to UBC standards, 
(T.220:17-25). Nevertheless, in a show of good faith, Jacksons 
offered to correct any construction deficiencies associated with 
the home at Jacksons' cost. (Exs. 34, 35;). Furthermore, 
Jacksons left the door open by stating that even though they were 
going forward with the Trustee's Sale, they would correct the 
construction deficiencies if they could get a commitment from 
Mostrongs for financing by the date of the sale. (T. 288:5-18; Ex. 
34, 35; Addendums D, E; Finding No. 28, 29, R. 525, 526). 
Jacksons never received a reply from Mostrongs to said 
offers, (T.288:5-18) nor did Mostrongs tender the property back 
to Jacksons or request a rescission of the contract. (T.289:8-
14,T.290:17-23,T.100:12-19) 
B. Mostrongs' Efforts To Obtain Financing Were Not 
Reasonable. 
The trial court's findings show that 1) Zions First National 
Bank was willing to loan the necessary financing after Larry 
Mostrong established residency and verification of income in Utah 
for two years (T.71:8-17,T.153:1-19 ); Mostrongs made no applica-
tion for financing from September 1, 1987 until approximately the 
time the Note became due on September 1, 1989 (T.72;7-13); 
Jacksons offered to carry financing for Mostrongs for an 
additional year upon certain conditions—Mostrongs refused. (T. 
286:7-17), After all apparent impediments to financing were 
removed, Mostrongs took no further steps to obtain bank or FHA 
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financing in order to pay off the Note. (The aforementioned 
facts support Finding No. 13, R. 531; Finding No. 18, R. 529; 
Finding No. 24, R. 528; and Findings No. 29 and 30, R. 526). 
Mostrongs argue that it would have been an exercise in 
futility to attempt financing before September 1, 1989, because 
of the two-year waiting period required to establish Larry 
Mostrong's residency and income verification in Utah. 
The irony in Mostrongs' argument and perhaps some of the 
most damaging evidence as to Mostrongs' position in this case, is 
that if Larry Mostrong was required to establish a two-year 
residency in Utah for verification of income, under no possible 
circumstances could Mostrongs ever have qualified for financing. 
The record is clear that Larry Mostrong resided in California 
during much of the time the contract was in effect and that he 
could not have established the required proof of residency and 
income in Utah at the time the Note became due. (T.73:21-25,T.74: 
1-7,T.98:16-22,T.149:13-25,T.150:1-17,T.153:2-27; Finding No. 18, 
R. 529). 
IX. THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY DETERMINED THAT ANY RIGHTS 
WHICH MOSTRONGS MAY HAVE HAD TO RESCISSION UNDER ANY STATED 
FACTS WERE WAIVED BY THE FAILURE OF MOSTRONGS TO PROMPTLY 
NOTIFY JACKSONS OF MOSTRONGS INTENTION TO RESCIND THE 
CONTRACT AND BY MOSTRONGS FAILURE TO TENDER BACK THE 
PROPERTY UPON MOSTRONGS LEARNING OF THE LACK OF LEGAL ACCESS 
OVER THE SOUTH LANE AND UPON LEARNING OF ALLEGED 
DEFICIENCIES IN THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE HOUSE LOCATED ON THE 
PROPERTY. 
Utah law is well established as to the responsibilities of 
the party who elects to rescind a contract. In Parry v. Woodall, 
438 P. 2d 813, (1968) the Utah Supreme Court announced the 
responsibility of a party who elects rescission as a remedy. In 
ruling that a party had waived his right to rescission of the 
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contract, the Court stated: "...one who claims he has been 
deceived and elects to rescind his contract by reason of fraud or 
misrepresentation of the other contracting party must act 
promptly and unequivocally in announcing his intention". 
(emphasis added) Id., at 815. 
The Court further stated: 
The law is well settled that one electing to 
rescind a contract must tender back to the other 
contracting party whatever property of value he has 
received. Woodall elected to retain possession of the 
corporate assets and to carry on the business until it 
was taken over in the receivership proceedings. We are 
of the opinion that Woodall waited too long, and that 
he cannot now rescind the contract. 
Id., at 815. 
Waiver has been defined as "the voluntary and intentional 
relinquishment of a known right" and may be either express or 
implied. 5 Williston on Contracts, § 678 (3rd Ed. 1961). 
Express waiver, when supported by reliance thereon, excuses non-
performance of the waived condition. 5 Williston on Contracts, § 
679 (3rd Ed. 1961); Restatement (2d) of Contract, § 84(1)(1981). 
In considering waiver of a breach of a contract condition, 
the Idaho Supreme Court stated in C.I.T. Corporation v. Hess, 395 
P.2d 471 (1964) that: 
Assuming plaintiff's breach was of a nature 
sufficient to discharge defendant's obligation to 
perform, it is well recognized that the obligation of 
a party under a bilateral contract may be recreated by 
the rendition of further performance, with knowledge of 
the fact entitling him to be discharged. 
Id. , at 475. (See Clover Park School District #400 v. Consolidat-
ed Dairy Products, Co., 15 Wash. App. 429, 550 P.2d 47 (1976), 
where the court stated, "[w]hen a party fails to take steps to 
rescind within a reasonable time and instead follows a course of 
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conduct inconsistent therewith, the conclusion follows that he 
has waived his right of rescission and chosen to continue the 
contract". Id., at 50. 
The trial court's finding that Mostrongs did not vacate the 
property until on or about September 25, 1990 (date of Trustee's 
Sale); and that Mostrongs did not tender the property back to 
Jacksons or notify Jacksons of any intent to repudiate or rescind 
the agreement, is supported by the record.(Finding No. 32,R. 525) 
Furthermore, that Mostrongs waived any right they may have 
had to rescission was established by their conduct, which was 
inconsistent with their current claims. 
The evidence shows that Mostrongs had both actual and 
constructive notice of the state of affairs regarding the legal 
access to the property. Even had Mostrongs testified that they 
were not concerned with access to the property, which is contrary 
to the evidence established at trial, Mostrongs were on construc-
tive notice regarding the chain of title to the property and as 
such were required to ascertain the record. After learning of 
the construction deficiencies noted in Joseph Stott's appraisal, 
Mostrongs nevertheless continued to remain in possession of the 
property, effectively ratifying the agreement. For approximately 
one year prior to the Trustee's Sale, Mostrongs made outward 
representations that they would accept the property under the 
agreement. Jacksons initially extended the final balloon payment 
under the Note for three months based on Jennifer Mostrongs 
representation that she was seeking financing (T.284:6-19) . 
Mostrongs actively sought continuations of the Trustee's Sale for 
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purposes of seeking an easement to the south lane (T.8518-22, 
T.78:9-17) and Jacksons accommodated them. 
After receiving the letter from the Millard County Commis-
sion accepting the south lane as a public road, Mostrongs 
represented to the appraiser, Joseph Stott, that the easement 
problem had been taken care of (T.119:17-22) and utilized said 
Millard County Commission letter of acceptance, for bank financ-
ing. (T.268:12-23). When Mostrongs were advised that financing 
could not be obtained through Valley Central Bank due to an 
inquiry regarding four construction deficiencies, Mostrongs took 
no further action. Even though Jacksons, in good faith, offered 
to pay for such structural deficiencies on two separate occa-
sions, Mostrongs refused to respond. Nevertheless, Mostrongs 
remained in possession of the property until the Trustee's Sale. 
Mostrongs never made contact with Jacksons to inform them as to 
why they suddenly ceased all efforts to obtain financing, once 
all apparent impediments had been removed. 
It has been established that Mostrongs never tendered the 
property back to Jacksons or requested their money. (T.289:9-14) 
Jennifer Mostrong herself testified that she never attempted to 
rescind the contract. (T.100:6-19) 
Mostrongs exhibited conduct inconsistent with rescission 
demonstrating their intent to let the contract stand. As a 
result, Jacksons continuously granted Mostrongs additional time 
in which to perform the terms of the contract (approximately 
thirteen months from the date the balloon payment became due). 
Nevertheless, once all alleged impediments to financing had been 
cured, Mostrongs elected to wait until approximately the same 
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time as the Trustee's Sale to file a lawsuit, while still in 
possession of the property. 
When Jacksons finally did take possession of the property 
several days after the Trustee's Sale, they noticed excessive 
waste and damage to the property- Jacksons thereafter spent 
thousands of dollars in order to restore the property as it was 
prior to the sale. (Finding No. 33, R. 525; Ex. 48). 
X. ATTORNEYS' FEES AND COURT COSTS ARE NOT WARRANTED IN THIS 
ACTION - THE PREVAILING PARTY IS ENTITLED TO COSTS ON 
APPEAL. 
The District Court correctly determined that neither party 
has shown a legal basis to support a claim for attorneys' fees. 
In Utah, attorneys' fees are not recoverable unless provided 
for by contract or by statute. Mountain States Broadcasting Co. 
v. Neal, 776 P.2d 643, 648 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
Mostrongs have not established that they would be entitled 
to attorneys' fees under any of the theories they claim 
(Mostrongs have failed to establish that there was fraudulent or 
negligent misrepresentation). Furthermore, the Jacksons having 
purchased the property at the Trustee's Sale, the provisions for 
attorneys' fees in the Note and Trust Deed were extinguished. 
The Court so properly concluded. 
CONCLUSION 
Mostrongs have failed to marshal the evidence in support of 
the trial court's findings to demonstrate that: "Even if viewed 
in the light most favorable to the trial court, the evidence is 
legally insufficient to support the findings". Reid v. Mutual of 
Omaha Ins. Co., 776 P.2d 896, 899 (Utah 1989). The findings 
should not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, with due regard 
49 
given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the 
credibility of witnesses. Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a). 
The District Court's findings and conclusions are greatly 
supported by the record. 
Based upon the authorities and arguments set forth herein, 
Appellee respectfully requests that the Court affirm the judgment 
entered by the District Court. 
DATED this / £ day of October, 1992 
RICHKRDXWADD INGHAM, ESQ. 
WADDINGHAM & PETERSON, P. 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellee 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, RICHARD WADDINGHAM, hereby certify that on the /j? day 
of October, 1992 I served upon Plaintiffs/Appellants four (4) 
true and correct copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellee by 
causing the same to be mailed, postage pre-paid, to the 
following: 
D. David Lambert 
Linda J. Barclay 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSON 
120 East 300 North 
Provo, Utah 84601 
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ADDENDUM 
E/ ..MEST MONEY SALES AGREEMEN. , ,'J «» *\ 
ntc No 1 2 J Lonv, Ocm Printing, Co 
iend======^25<X) No(0) EARNEST MONEY RECEIPT 
DATE July l£,V?P7 
The undersigned Buyer T p**>y V n c t r n n g , 1 ^ < O f t o t i l o ^VJVQ, -Jl C e n t r O , CA 9 ? 2 l l 3 — hereby deposits with Brokerage 
ARNEST MONEY the amount of T ^ T / P " n n ^ r p H
 D o i l a r s ( $ 5 0 0 t O O j 
he form of t P e r s o n a l ch?C.k which shall be deposited in accordance with applicable State Law 
Earnest money check to be deposited Friday July 17, 1987^ r 
Davies k Go, Realty 7U3-687S Received by ^ / V C M A X ^ ^ )^aJJ\LL^ 
kerage Phone Number ^~^ 
OFFER TO PURCHASE 
PROPERTY DESCRIPTION The above stated EARNEST MONEY is given to secure and apply on the purchase of the .property situated at —JcLSt 
F l o w e l l ,n the City of County of M l l l a r i Utah 
;ct to any restrictive covenants zoning regulations utility or other easements or r»6h(s of way government patents or state deads of record approved by Buyer 
cordaVce with Sect.on G Sa.d property is more particularly described as S o u t h One h a l f O f S o u t h w e s t 1 / U o f N o r t h e a s t 1 / U 
Southeast l/h of Sec. 22
 ? T. 21 S.. K. S W»» S.L»M, containing 5 Acres, 
HECK APPLICABLE BOXES 
I UNIMPROVED REAL PROPERTY D Vacant Lot D Vacant Acreage OOther _ _ 
I IMPROVED REAL PROPERTY D Commercial D Residential D Condo D Other ftanchette 
(a) 'Included items. Unless excluded below, this sale shall include all fixtures and any of the items shown in Section A if presently attached to the property 
The following personal property shall also be included in this sale and conveyed under separate Bill of Sale with warranties as to title C a r p e t s j d r a p e s 
Fltohpn rt,ove * T?qfr1.e*rfltQr fr Wood stove t 
(b) Excluded items The following items are specifically excluded from this sale G a s J o t t l e , T i l e p h o n e s M i c r o w a v e O V e n » 
(c) CONNECTIONS, UTILITIES AND OTHER RIGHTS Seller represents that the property includes the following improvements in the purchase price 
3public sewer Dconnected CXwell [^connected Dother [^electricity ^connected 
] septic tank 33 connected G irrigation water/secondary system Congress & egress by private easement 
]other sanitary system *f of shares Company D dedicated road D paved 
]public water Dconnected DTV antenna Dmaster antenna Dprewired Dcurb and gutter 
]private water Dconnected Dnatural gas Dconnected Dother rights 
(d) Survey A certified survey Dshall be furnished at the expense of prior to closing Oshall not be furnished 
(e) Buyer Inspection Buyer has made a visual inspection of the property and subject to Section 1 (c) above and 6 below accepts it in its present physical 
condition, except No e x c e p t i o n s 
PURCHASE PRICE AND FINANCING. The total purchase price for the property is C J J < t y F J V ? " f a o u q a r v i 
Dollars ($ ^ 5 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 ) which shall be paid as follows 
which represents the aforedesenbed EARNEST MONEY DEPOSIT 
representing the approximate balance of CASH DOWN PAYMENT at closing 
representing the approximate balance of an existing mortgage, trust deed note, real estate contract or other encumbrance to be assumed 
by buyer which obligation bears jnterest at % per annum with monthly payments of $ 
which include Dpnncipal, Dinterest Dtaxes Dinsurance, Dcondo fees Dother „ 
representing the approximate balance of an additional existing mortgage, trust deed note real estate contract or other encumbrances to be 
assumed by Buyer which obligation bears interest at % per annum with monthly payments of $ 
which include Dpnncipal. Dinterest Dtaxes. Dinsurance, Dcondo fees Dother 
representing balance if any, including proceeds from a new loan to be paid as follows 
\ 5 0 0 , 0 0 Other ^vn~ P r n n o q H g r>f n l o a n t n h p n,gHp h y 7H nn* l a n k , ( ^ . ^ t f t i OV O t h e r 
—: j novernT^n"1 A.genry — 
IOOO.OO TOTAL PURCHASE PRICE 
uyer is required to assume an underlying obligation and/or obtain outside financing. Buyer agrees to use best efforts to assume and/or procure same and this 
made subject to Buyer qualifying for and lending institution granting said assumption and/or financing Buyer agrees to make application within __£ 
ter Seller s acceptance of this Agreement to assume the underlying obligation and/or obtain the new financing at an interest rate not to exceed % 
r does not qualify for the assumption and/or financing within I S days after Seller s acceptance of this Agreement this Agreement shall be voidable 
jption of the Buyer or^eller upon written notice 
er agrees to pay sffi , 0 0 towards Buyer s total financing and closing costs including but not limited to loan discount points 
A « r « « ^ 
EARNESi MONEY SALES AGREL.rfENT 
Legend Yes (X) No (0) 
This is a legally binding contract. Read the entire document carefully before signing. 
GENERAL PROVISIONS 
• • (Sections?) 
A-^JNCLUDED ITEMS.. Unless excluded herein, this sale shall include all fixtures and any of the following items if presently attached to the property: plumbing 
itihg/ajr-conditioning and ventilating fixtures and equipment, water heater, built-in appliances, light fixtures and bulbs, bathroom fixtures, curtains 8nd draperies 
i rods/window and door screens, storm doors, window blinds, awnings, installed television antenna, wall-to-wall carpets, water softener, automatic garage dot 
iner end transmitter(s), fencing, trees and shrubs. 
B.~ INSPECTION. Unless otherwise indicated. Buyer agrees that Buyer is purchasing said property upon Buyer's own examination and judgment and not b, 
ison of iany representation madeito Buyer by Seller or the listing or Selling Brokerage as to its condition, size, location, present value, future value, income 
refrom or'as to its production Buyer accepts the property in "as is" condition subject to Seller's warranties as outlined in Section 6 In the event Buyer desires 
/ additional inspection, said inspection shall be allowed by Seller but arranged for and paid by Buyer 
C. SELLER WARRANTIES. Seller warrants that (a) Seller has received no claim nor notice of any building or zoning violation concerning the property whicr 
s not or will not be remedied prior to closing; (b) all obligations against the property including taxes, assessments, mortgages, hens or other encumbrance* 
any nature shall be brought current on or before closing, and (c) the plumbing, heating, air conditioning and ventilating systems electrical system, and appliance, 
all be sound or tn satisfactory working condition at closing 
0 . - CONDITION OF WELL. SeUer warrants that any private well serving the property has, to the best of Sellers' knowledge provided an adequate supply i 
iter and continued use of the well or wells is authorized by a state permit or other legal water right 
E. CONDITION OF SEPTIC TANK. Seller warrants that any septic tank serving the property is. to the best of Seller's knowledge, in good working order anc 
*ller has no knowledge of any needed repairs and it meets all applicable government health and construction standards 
F. ACCELERATION CLAUSE. No later than fifteen (15) days after Seller's acceptance of this Agreement, but not less than three (3) days prior to closing 
eller shall provide to Buyer written verification as to whether or not any notes, mortgages, deeds of trust or real estate contracts against the property require tM 
jnsent of the holder of such instrument(s) to the sale of the property or permit the holder to raise the interest rate and/or declare the entire balance due in ti-
•ent of sale. If any such document so provides and holder does not waive the same or unconditionally approve the sale, then within three (3) days after notice of 
onwaiver or disapproval or on the date of closing, whichever is earlier, Buyer shall have the option to declare this Agreement null and void by giving written notice 
) Seller or Seller s agent In such case, all earnest money received under this Agreement shall be returned to Buyer It is understood and agreed that if provisions 
>r said "Due on Sale ' clause are set forth in Section 7 herein, alternatives allowed herein shall become null and void 
G TITLE INSPECTION. No later than fifteen (15) days after Seller's acceptance of this Agreement, but not less than three (3) days prior to closing, Buyc< 
hall have the opportunity to inspect either an abstract of title brought current with an attorney's opinion, or a preliminary title report on the subject property 
luyer shall have a period of three (3) days after receipt thereof to examine and accept. If Buyer does not accept, Buyer shall give written notice thereof to Seliu^ 
»r Seller's agent, within the prescribed time period specifying objections to title. Thereafter, Seller shall be required, through escrow at closing, to cure tlu 
lefect(s) to which Buyer has objected. If said defect(s) is not curable through an escrow agreement at closing, this Agreement shall be null and void at the opt«v» 
)f the Buyer, and all monies received herewith shall be returned to the respective parties. 
H. TITLE INSURANCE. If title insurance is elected, Seller authorizes the Listing Brokerage to order a preliminary commitment for a standard form AU7 
policy of title insurance to be issued by such title insurance company as Seller shall designate Title policy to be issued shall contain no exceptions other ths. 
hose provided for in said standard form. *and the encumbrances or defects excepted under the final contract of sale If title cannot be made so insurable through 
an escrow agreement at closing, the earnest money shall, unless Buyer elects to waive such defects or encumbrances, be refunded to Buyer, and this Agreeme. 
shall thereupon be terminated Seller agrees to pay any cancellation charge 
I. EXISTING TENANT LEASES If Buyer is to take title subject to an existing lease or leases. Seller agrees to provide to Buyer no later than fifteen (1 5) day 
after Seller's acceptance of this Agreement, but not less than three (3) days prior to closing, a copy of all ex.stmg leases (and any amendments thereto) affectu 
the property. Unless written objection is given by Buyer to Seller or Seller's agent within three (3) working days thereafter, Buyer shall take title subject to sue 
leases. If objection is not remedied within the stated time, this Agreement shall be null and void 
J. .CHANGES DURING TRANSACTION. During the pendency of this Agreement, Seller agrees that no changes m any existing leases shall be made, n 
new leases entered into, nor shall any substantial alterations or improvements be made or undertaken without the written consent oMhe Buyer 
„HO CpNVjEYANCE OF Tl" Seller represents lluit Seller D holds title to the pr ty in fee simple D is purchasing the properly undi 
s act Transfer of Seller's ownersi interest shall be made as sm iorth m Suction S SoUur agrees to furnish good and marketable \\\\o to \h 
*/j$c"t to encumbrances and exceptions noted heroin, evidenced by O a current policy of title insurance in the amount of purchase price D an abstrac 
ctught current, with an attorney s opinion (See Section H) 
4<< INSPECTION OF TITLE. In accordance with Section G, Buyer shall have the opportunity to inspect the title to the subject property prior to closing 
uyer;'shall,Jake title subject to any existing restrictive covenants, including condominium restrictions (CC & R s) Buyer Q has D has not reviewed any condo-
ifnium^QC^R s prior to signing this Agreement. 
$11 VESTING'OF JITLE. Title shall vest in Buyer as follows L a r r V L« M o s t r O D C ) a n d J p n i f p r ft. M n c t r n n n 
Bs^Jolnt tenants K 
6/SSP.El-lER WARRANTIES In addition to warranties contained in Section C, the following ifems are also warranted 
xceDttdfts~tb7the above and Section C shall be limited to the following 
L / . ^ P E U I A L c O N S i u t K A i i U N S ANU UUNTINGENCIES. This offer is made subject to the following special conditions and/or contingencies which mus 
i satisfied Vnor to closing S P I I P T R t n pay c l o s i n g cos t3 f points and appraisal feeg» 
8 CLOSING OF SALE This Agreement shall be closed on or before 1 5 A j j n t t q t 1 ^ a t a reasonable location to be designated b 
»ller, subject to Section Q Upon demand, Buyer shall deposit with the Escrow "Closing* umce all documents necessary to complete the purchase in accordance 
th this Agreement Prorations set forth in Section R, shall be made as of u date of possession Q date of closing Q other _____ _ _ 
9 PQSSESSION. Seller shall deliver possession to Buyer on . . unless extended by written agreement of parties 
.10, ,GENERAL PROVISIONS Unless otherwise indicated above, the General Provision Sections on the reverse side hereof are incorporated into this-
jreement by reference 
j 
' 1 1 . " AGREEMENT TO PURCHASE AND TIME LIMIT FOR ACCEPTANCE. ^ Buyer offers to purchase the property on the above terms and conditions Seller 
all have until. (XM/PM) i l l l l y ? f l , 1 9 ff*7 . to accept this offer Unless accepted, this offer shall lapse and the Agent shall return the 
ERNEST MONEY to the Buyer 
gnature of Buyer 7-Af$f Signature of Buyer Dat 
1ECKONE ^ 
ACCEPTANCE OF OFFER TO PURCHASE Seller hereby ACCEPTS the foregoing offer on the terms and conditions specified above 
REJECTION Seller hereby REJECTS the foregoing offer .'(Seller's Initials) 
COUNTER OFFER Seller hereby accepts the foregoing offer SUBJECT TO the exceptions or modifications as specified below or in the attached Addendum, anc 
presents said COUNTER OFFER for Buyer s acceptance Buyer shall have until ( A M / P M ) , 19 to accept the term 
specified below 
ite 7-/^-^7 l ^/r S) 
™ .. ^ , W ? (A^PM? .</£(• no 
Signat 
fECKONE 
Buyer accepts the counter offer 
Buyer accepts with modifications on attached addendum 
ite 
ure of S e l W / / ' Sj(jnature of/Seller 
. (AM-PM) Signature of Buyer Signature of Buyer 
COMMISSION The undersigned hereby agrees to pay to DflVJ F f i & C D * R p f l l t , \ / 
:ommis>iQn
 0f F j y / g (%5% ) as considerat/on k/r the efforts in procujjog a buyer 
Date ^ Signature of Seller 
, (Brokerage 
7 // Dat 
DOCUMENT RECEIPT 
State Law requires Broker to furnish Buyer and Seller with copies of this Agreement bearing all signatures (One of the following alternatives must therefor 
completed) 
A D I acknowledge receipt of a final copy of the foregoing Agreement bearing all signatures 
3NATUREOF SELLER /j _ SIGj^TURE o£fci#ER 
v 7 (I Date 
R n i norcn -> ii / rancoH y final rnrwj nf thp (nrpnmnn Anrppmpnt hpnnnn all sianatures to be mailed on . 
?~*r-& / 
Date 
Date 
. , 19 by 
K AUTHORITY OF SIGNATORS If Buyer or Seller is a corporat.on. partnership trust estate or other entity, the person executing this Agreement on . 
ihalf warrants his or her authority to do so and to bind Buyer or Seller 
' ^ C O M P L E T E AGREEMENT - NO VERBAL AGREEMENTS. This instrument constitutes the entire Agreement between the part.es and supersedes a* 
mcels any and all prior negotiations, representations, warranties, understandings or agreements between the parties There are no verbal agreements which mod> 
affect this agreement. This Agreement cannot be changed except by mutual written agreement of the parties 
M. COUNTER OFFERS. Any counter offer made by Seller or Buyer shall be in writ ing and, if attached hereto shall incorporate all the provisions of th > 
jreement not expressly modified or excluded therein 
N.~DEFAULT/INTERPLEADER AND ATTORNEY'S FEES. In the event of default by Buyer. Seller may elect to either retain the earnest money as liquidate J 
images or to institute suit to enforce any rights of Seller In the event of default by Seller, or if this sale fails to close because of the nonsatisfaction of an 
press condition or contingency to which the sale is subject pursuant to this Agreement (other than by virtue of any default by Buyer), the earnest money depos \( 
lall be returned to Buyer. Both parties agree that, should either party default in any of the covenants or agreements herein contained, the defaulting party shas 
ly all costs and expenses, including a reasonable attorney's fee. which may arise or accrue from enforcing or terminating this Agreement, or in pursuing ar
 r 
medy provided hereunder or by applicable law. whether such remedy is pursued by filing suit or otherwise In the event the principal broker holding the earnes 
oney deposit is requ.red to file an interpleader action in court to resolve a dispute over the earnest money deposit referred to herein, the Buyer and Selk 
ithonze the principal broker to draw from the earnest money deposit an amount necessary to advance the costs of bringing the interpleader action The amour
 t 
deposit remaining after advancing those costs shall be interpleaded into court in accordance with state law The Buyer and Seller further agree that the defaulting 
irty shall pay the court costs and reasonable attorney s fees incurred by the principal broker in bringing such action 
0 . ABROGATION. Execution of a final real estate contract, if any, shall abrogate this Agreement 
P. RISK OF LOSS. All risk of loss or damage to the property shall be borne by the Seller until closing In the event there is loss or damage to the proper, 
tween the date hereof and the date of closing, by reason of fire, vandalism, flood, earthquake, or acts of God, 8nd the cost to repair such damage shall exceed 
i percent (10%) of the purchase price of the property. Buyer may. at his option either proceed with this transaction if Seller agrees in writing to repair or 
place damaged property prior to closing, or declare this Agreement null and void If damage to property is less than ten percent (10%) of the purchase price 
id Seller agrees in writ ing to repair or replace and does actually repair and replace damaged property prior to closing this transaction shall proceed as agreeu ' 
Q TIME IS OF ESSENCE—UNAVOIDABLE DELAY. In the event that this sale cannot be closed by the date provided herein due to interruption of transport 
ikes, fire, flood, extreme weather governmental regulations, acts of God. or similar occurrences beyond the control of Buyer or Seller then the closing date shai. 
extended seven (7) days beyond cessation of such condition, but in no event more than thirty (30) days beyond the closing date provided herein Thereafter 
ne is of the essence This provision relates only to the extension of closing date "Closing shall mean the date on which all necessary instruments are signe^ 
d delivered by all parties to the transaction 
R CLOSING COSTS. Seller and Buyer shall each pay one half (112) of the escrow closing fee unless otherwise required by the lending institution Cost* 
providing title insurance or an abstract brought current shall be paid by Seller Taxes and assessments for the current year, insurance if acceptaole to the Buyef 
its, and interest on assumed obligations shall be prorated as set forth in Section 8 Unearned deposits on tenancies and remaining mortgage or other reserve> 
all be assigned to Buyer at closing 
S REAL PROPERTY CONVEYANCING. If this agreement is for conveyance of fee title, title shall be conveyed by warranty de«d free of defects other th<*r 
ose excepted herein If this Agreement is for sale or transfer of a Seller's interest under an existing real estate contract Seller may transfer by either (a) special 
irranty deed, containing Seller s assignment of said contract in form sufficient to convey after acquired title or (b) by a new real estate contract incorporating the 
id existing real estate contract therein 
T AGENCY DISCLOSURE Selling Brokerage may have entered into an agreement to represent the Seller 
U BROKERAGE For purposes of this Agreement any references to the term "Brokerage shall mean the respective listing or selling real estate office 
V DAYS For purposes of this Agreement any references to the term days shall mean business or working days exclusive of legal holidays 
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ALTA Owner s Policy 
FormB — 1970 
(Amended 10-17-70) 
(Standard Coverage) 
^ 
s *MER, 
\ 
c 
OWNER'S 
POLICY 
COPY 
POLICY OF TITLE INSURANCE 
ISSUED THROUGH THE OFFICE OF 
<^S OF SOUTHERN UTAH 
180 SOUTH MAIN • P.O. BOX 658 • FILLMORE, UTAH 84631 
(801) 743-6213 
SUBJECT TO THE EXCLUSIONS FROM COVERAGE, THE EXCEPTIONS CONTAINED IN SCHEDULE B AND THE 
PROVISIONS OF THE CONDITIONS AND STIPULATIONS HEREOF, FIRST AMERICAN TITLE INSURANCE COM-
PANY a California corporation, herein called the Company, insures, as of Date of Policy shown in Schedule A, 
against loss or damage, not exceeding the amount of insurance stated in Schedule A, and costs, attorneys' fees 
and expenses which the Company may become obligated to pay hereunder, sustained or incurred by the insured 
by reason of 
1 title to the estate or interest described in Schedule A being vested otherwise than as stated therein, 
2 any defect in or hen or encumbrance on such title, 
3 lack of a right of access to and from the land, or 
4 unmarketability of such title 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, First American Title Insurance Company has caused this policy to be signed and sealed by 
its duly authorized officers as of Date of Policy shown in Schedule A 
First American Title Insurance Company 
/ <
; \ u [ . . : * ^ \ 
\ - SE°TEMBER 24 • * / 
1968 ' <r i \ 
BY 
ATTEST 
COUNTERSIGNED 
PRESIDENT 
^ v 
c^c^r^. 
SECRETARY ASSISTANT SECRETARY 
scutum L o: EXCLUSIONS FROM COVERAGE 
THE FOLLOWING MATTERS ARE EXPRESSLY EXCLUDED F-ROM THE COVERAGE OF THIS POLICY 
1. ANY LAW, ORDINANCE OR GOVERNMENTAL REGULATION (INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO BUILDJNC? AND ZONING ORDINA 
RESTRICTING OR REGULATING OR PROHIBITING THE OCCUPANCY, USE OR ENJOYMENT OF THE LAND, OR REGULATING THE , 
ACTER, DIMENSIONS OR LOCATION OF ANY IMPROVEMENT NOW OR HEREAFTER ERECTED ON THE LAND, OR PROHIBIT' 
SEPARATION IN OWNERSHIP OR A REDUCTION IN THE DIMENSIONS OR AREA OF THE LAND, OR THE EFFECT OF ANY VIOL/ 
OF ANY SUCH LAW, ORDINANCE OR GOVERNMENTAL REGULATION. 
2 RIGHTS OF EMINENT DOMAIN OR GOVERNMENTAL RIGHTS OF POLICE POWER UNLESS NOTICE OF THE EXERCISE OF SUCH R K 
APPIARS IN THE PUBLIC RECORDS AT DATE OF POLICY. 
3 DEFTCTS, LIENS, ENCUMBRANCES, ADVERSE CLAIMS, OR OTHER MATTERS (a) CREATED, SUFFERED, ASSUMED OR AGREED U 
THE INSURED CLAIMANT, (b) NOT KNOWN TO THE COMPANY AND NOT SHOWN BY THE PUBLIC RECORDS BUT KNOWN TC 
INSURED CLAIMANT EITHER AT DATE OF POLICY OR AT THE DATE SUCH CLAIMANT ACQUIRED AN ESTATE OR INTL 
INSURED BY THIS POLICY AND NOT DISCLOSED IN WRITING BY THE INSURED CLAIMANT TO THE COMPANY PRIOR TO THE 
SUCH INSURED CLAIMANT BECAME AN INSURED HEREUNDER; (c) RESULTING IN NO LOSS OR DAMAGE TO THE INSURED CLAIi\ 
(d) ATTACHING OR CREATED SUBSEQUENT TO DATE OF POLICY; OR (e) RESULTING IN LOSS OR DAMAGE WHICH WOULD NOT r 
BEEN SUSTAINED IF THE INSURED CLAIMANT HAD PAID VALUE FOR THE ESTATE OR INTEREST INSURED BY THIS PC 
CONDITIONS AND STIPULATIONS 
1. DEF IN IT ION OF TERMS 
The following terms v^hen used in this 
policy mucin 
(a) insured' the insured named in 
Schedule A, and subject to * n / rights or defenses 
the Company may have had against the named in 
sured, those who succeed to the interest of such 
insured by operation of law as distinguished from 
purchase including, but not limited to, heirs, 
distnbutees, devisees, survivors personal representa 
tives, next of kin, or corporate or fiduciary 
successors 
(b) "insured claimant" an insured 
claiming 'oss or damage hereunder 
(c) "knowledge ' actual knowledge, 
not constructive knowledge or notice which may be 
imputed to an insured by reason of any public 
records 
(d) land the lund described, speci 
ficaliy or by reference in Schedule C, and improve-
ments affixed thereto which by law constitute real 
property, provided, however, the term "land" does 
not include any property beyond the lines of the 
area specifically described or referred to m Schedule 
C, nor any right, title, interest estate or easement 
in abutting streets, roads, avenues, alleys, lanes, 
ways or waterways but nothing herein shall modi 
fy or limit the extent to which a right of access to 
and from the land is insured by this policy 
(e) "mortgage ' mortgage, deed of 
trust, trust deed, or other security instrument 
(f) "public records ' those records 
which by Uw impart constructive notice of matters 
relating to said land 
2. CONTINUATION OF INSURANCE AFTER 
CONVEYANCE OF TI^LE 
The coverage of this policy shall continue in 
force as of Date of Policy m favor of an insured so 
long as such insured retains an estate or interest in 
the land, or holds an indebtedness secured by a pur-
chase monev mortgage given by a purchaser from 
such insured, or so long as such insured shall have 
liability by reason of covenants of warranty made 
by such insured in any transfer or conveyance of 
such estate or interest, provided, however, this 
policy shall not continue in force in favor of any 
purchaser from such insured of either said estate or 
interest or the indebtedness secured by a purchase 
money mortgage given to such insured 
3. DEFENSE AND PROSECUTION OF AC 
T I O \ , - NOTICE O r CLAIM TO BE 
G I V n BY AN INSURED CLAIMANT 
(a) The Company at its own cost and with 
out undue o lay shah piovide for the defense of an 
insured in all litigation consisting of actions or 
proceedings commenced against such insured, or a 
defense interposed against an insured in an action 
to enforce a contract for a sale of the estate or 
interest in said land, to the extent that such liti 
gation is founded upon an alleged defect, lien, 
pneumbrance, or other matter insured against 
by this policy 
(b)The insured shall notify the Company 
promptly in writing (i) in case any action or pro-
ceeding is begun or defense is interposed as set 
forth in la) above, (n) in case knowledge shall 
come to an insured hereunder of any claim of title 
or interest which is adverse to the title to the 
estate or interest, as insured, and which might 
cause loss or damage for which the Company may 
be liable by virtue of this policy, or (m) if title to 
the estate or interest, as insured, is rejected as un 
marketable If such prompt notice shall not be 
given to the Company, then as to such insured all 
liability of the Company shall cease and terminate 
in regard to the matter or matters for which such 
prompt notice is required, provided, however, that 
failure to notify shall in no case prejudice the 
rights of any such insured under this policy unless 
the Company shall be prejudiced by such failure 
and then only to the extent of such prejudice 
(c) The Company shall have the right at its 
own cost to institute and without undue delay 
prosecute any action or proceeding or to do any 
other act which in its opinion may be necessary or 
desirable to establish the title to the estate or in-
terest as insured, and the Company may take any 
appropriate action under the terms of this policy, 
whether or not it shall be liable thereunder, and 
shall not thereby concede liability or waive any 
provision of this policy 
(d) Whenever the Company shall have 
brought any action or interposed a defense as re-
quired or permitted by the provisions of this policy, 
the Company may pursue any such litigation to 
final determination by a court of competent juris-
diction and expressly reserves the right, in its sole 
discretion, to appeal from any adverse judgment or 
order 
(e) In all cases where this policy permits 
or requires the Company to prosecute or provide 
for the defense of any action or proceeding, the in-
sured hereunder shall secure to the Company the 
right to so prosecute or provide defense in such ac-
tion or proceeding, and all appeals therein, and per-
mit the Company to use, at its option, the name of 
such insured for such purpose Whenever requested 
by the Company, such insured shall give the 
Company all reasonable aid in any such action or 
proceeding in effecting settlement, securing evi 
dence obtaining witnesses, or prosecuting or de-
fending such action or proceeding, and the Company 
shall reimburse such insured for any e<pense so 
incurred 
4. NOTICE OF LOSS - L IMITATION 
ACTION 
In addition to the notices required 
paragraph 3(b) of these Conditions and StipuU 
a statement in writing of any loss or d a n \ 
which it is claimed the Company is liabk 
this policy shall be furnished to the Coi
 r 
within 90 days after such loss or damage shai 
been determined and no right of action shall oJ 
to an insured claimant until 30 days afte 
statement shall have been furnished Faik r 
furnish such statement of loss or damage 
terminate any liability of the Company und<-
policy as to such loss or damage 
5 OPTIONS TO PAY OR OTHERWISE 
TLE CLAIMS 
The Company shall have the option to s 
otherwise settle for or in the name of an ir 
claimant any claim insured against or to ten 
all liability and obligations of the Company 
under by paying or tendering payment c f 
amount of insurance under this policy tog 
with any costs, attorneys' fees and expense 
curred up to the time of such payment or ten 
payment, by the insured claimant and authc 
by the Company 
6. DETERMINATION AND PAYMEN i 
LOSS 
(a) The liability of the Company uno* 
policy shall in no case exceed the least of 
(i) the actual loss of the in 
claimant, or 
(it) the amount of insurance stu 
Schedule A 
(b) The Company will pay, in additiu 
any loss insured against by this policy, all co, 
posed upon an insured in litigation carried r 
the Company for such insured, and all < 
attorneys' fees and expenses in litigation c< 
on by such insured with the written authonz 
of the Company 
(c) When liability has been definitely 
in accordance with the conditions of this p 
the loss or damage shall be payable within 3C 
thereafter 
{Continued on inside back cover) 
i'onn No, 1.402 - A 
ALIA OwueT' > Pol icy 
Form £ - 1970 
Or r No, 264J3-M 
SCHEDULE A COPY 
Total Foe for T i t l e Search, Fxarciration 
And T i t l * InHutfmco $347.50 
Auount o£ Insurance: $65,000.00 Policy No. 5198-12M 
Oate oi Polic^ September 1, 1987 wt 11:04 A.ll, 
]* I^ a,nr. ot Irjbur^d: 
1.AFRY 3-. MOSTt'ONG ind JENNIFER G, MOSTi^NG 
1', Thu <?-i4it*s or iur<*ri»Kt rel*»rrH to horsi'i 1 •> at f< ^  of Policy vented in: 
LARRY U M0STR0HG and JENRIFKR C. MOSTRONG, 
his wife as joint tensors 
3* The. «btate or Interest in the land described in Schedule C and which is 
cov*>r'c* bv this policy la: 
FF.E SIMPi.F 
. ' .
j rn No. i4 ' - 0 'j\y?>-i£A 
ALTA S t a n d a r d Po l icy 
Ui.stern Re^ Ion 
SCHEDULE B 
This policy does not injure against loss or damage by reason oi the matter** 
ihown in piiits ow and two following: 
PART ONE; 
U T&xt\s «r assessments which are not shown as existing liens by the records 
of duy taxing authority that levies tax*s or assesbiu^nts oa real property 
or bv th*> public records, 
2. Aay facts, rights, Interests, or claims which art- not ^hown by rh* public 
records but which could be ascertained bv an inspection of said land or 
by uokinq inquiry of persons in possession thereof. 
3» Enuemo\itsf claims of easement or encumbrance which are not shown by the 
public records. 
4, Discrepancies* conflicts in boundary Jinas, shortage In area, 
encroachments, or any other f.ictb which n correct survey would disclose, 
and which are not shown by public records. 
5, Unpatented mining claims; reservations or exceptions in patents or in 
Acts authorizing the issuance thereof; water rights, claims or title to 
water* 
C kiy I U P M or right to « 11 *n, for eervk-fts, labor or uaterinl theretofore 
or h<Meeftsr furnished, imposed by law and not shown by the public 
records* 
PART TWO: 
!• Taxes tor the year 1987 now a li«n, not yet due. 
2. Faeemr-it tor Road and Utility purposes over the East 33 feet of said 
property as recited in cunsne lustruio^nts of record* 
3, A D*cd o£ Trust dite.d September 1, 1987• executed by LARKY U MOSTRONG 
and JENNIFER C* KOSTRONG, his wife, ns Trustor, to secure payment of a 
note bearing even date thereof in the suia of $45,000*00 with Interest 
thereon, payable as therein provided, to SECURITY TITLE COMPANY OB' 
SOUTHERN UTAii as Trustee, in favor of T,FE ROY JACKSON and MARGARET R. 
JACKSON, his wife as joint tenants, as Beneficiary* recorded September 1, 
1967 a. Entry No, 65995 in Book 211 at Page 670 of Official Records. 
4* Oil and G*a Lease dated November 15, 1977 trom RESORT PROPERTIES, INC., a 
ttevada corporation, as Lessor, to PLACID OIL COMPANY, a Delaware 
corporation, as Lessee for a term of 10 year* from November 15, 1977, and 
so long thereafter as oil unci gas, or either of them, is produced from 
the 1-ind, upon the terras, conditions and covenants therein provided; 
recorded December 20, 1977 as Entry No, 23299 in Book 125 at Page 174 of 
Offiei il Records* 
QPY 
1 fKJ • 
An undivided interest of PLACID OIL COMPANY in anid""l)tl and Gas leus* was 
assip.n'»d to 10131 ST ANA-HUNT PLTROLEUM CORPORATION *,n undivided 16,80672% 
and to F.0SEW00D RESOURCFS Ji'JC. an undivided 18.90756% by Assignment, 
Conveyance and Hill of Sa]g dated Jure 13, 1983^ recorded February 6, 
1984 (JK Entry No. 51269 in Book 179 <\X Vn%* 271 of Official. Records. 
Th« Interest of PLACID OLL COMPANY, LOU F SI ANA-HUNT PETROLEUM CORPORATION 
and ROSEWOOD RESOURCES (FOC) , LXC< in said lease was assigned to SOH10 
PETROLEUM COMPANY by Assignment of Lc>anc>s dated April 2, 1984 and 
recorded November 23, 1984 as Entry No. 54306 in Look 1&6 at Page 237 of 
Official Records. 
SCHEDULE C 
The land referred to ia this policy is situated io the St.atp of Utah, Couocy 
ot MiJlard and is described ah follows: 
The South LalE ot the Southwest quarter of th'-i Northeast quarter of the 
Southeast quarter of Section 22, Township 21 South. Range 5 U&st, Sale Lake 
Base **nd Meridian. 
EXCEPTING THEREFROM 1/4 of all o1l$ gas and other minor/Us in, on or uader 
said land, together with the right of ingress And egress for the purpose of 
exploring uiui/or removing the same. 
:< it rt 
CONDITIONS AND STIPULATIONS 
(Continued from inside front cover) 
7. L I M I T A T I O N OF L I A B I L I T Y 
No claim shall arise or be maintainable under 
this policy (a) if the Company, after having received 
notice of an alleged defect, lien or encumbrance in-
sured against hereunder, by lit igation or otherwise, 
removes such defect, lien or encumbrance or es-
tablishes the tit le, as insured, wi th in a reasonable 
time after receipt of such notice; (b) in the event 
of l i t igation unt i l there has been a final determina-
tion by a court of competent jurisdict ion, and dis-
position of all appeals therefrom, adverse to the 
t i t le, as insured, as provided in paragraph 3 hereof; 
or (c) for l iabil i ty voluntari ly assumed by an in-
sured in settling any claim or suit wi thout prior 
wr i t ten consent of the Company. 
8. REDUCTION OF L I A B I L I T Y 
Al l payments under this pol icy, except pay-
ments made for costs, attorneys' fees and ex-
penses, shall reduce the amount of the insurance 
pro tanto. No payment shall be made wi thout 
producing this policy for endorsement of such 
payment unless the policy be lost or destroyed, in 
which case proof of such loss or destruction shall 
be furnished to the satisfaction of the Company. 
9. L I A B I L I T Y N O N C U M U L A T I V E 
It is expressly understood that the amount of 
insurance under this policy shall be reduced by any 
amount the Company may pay under any policy 
insuring either (a) a mortgage shown or referred to 
in Schedule B hereof which is a lien on the estate 
or interest covered by this policy, or (b) a mortgage 
hereafter executed by an insured which is a charge 
or lien on the estate or interest described or re-
ferred to in Schedule A, and the amount so paid 
shall be deemed a payment under this policy. The 
Company shall have the option to apply to the pay-
ment of any such mortgages any amount that 
otherwise would be payable hereunder to the in-
sured owner of the estate or interest covered by 
this poiicy and the amount so paid shall be deemed 
a payment under this policy to said insured owner. 
10. APPORTIONMENT 
If the land described in Schedule C con-
sists of two or more parcels which are not used as 
a single site, and a loss is established affecting one 
or more of said parcels but not all, the loss shall 
be computed and settled on a pro rata basis as if 
the amount of insurance under this policy was di-
vided pro rata as to the value on Date of Policy of 
each separate parcel to the whole, exclusive of any 
improvements made subsequent to Date of Policy, 
unless a l iabil i ty or value has otherwise been agreed 
upon as to each such parcel by the Company and 
the insured at the time of the issuance of this 
policy and shown by an express statement herein 
or by an endorsement attached hereto. 
11 . SUBROGATION UPON PAYMENT OR 
SETTLEMENT 
Whenever the Company shall have settled a 
claim under this policy, all right of subrogation 
shall vest in the Company unaffected by any act of 
the insured claimant. The Company shall be subro-
gated to and be entitled to all rights and remedies 
which such insured claimant would have had against 
any person or property in respect to such claim 
had this policy not been issued, and if requested by 
the Company, such insured claimant shall transfer 
to the Company all rights and remedies against any 
person or property necessary in order to perfect 
such right of subrogation and shall permit the 
Company to use the name of such insured cloimant 
in any transaction or l it igation involving such rights 
or remedies. If the payment does not cover the 
loss of such insured claimant, the Company shall be 
subrogated to such rights and remedies in the pro-
port ion which said payment bears to the amount of 
said loss. If loss should result f rom any act of such 
insured claimant, such act shall not void this policy, 
but the Company, in that event, shall be required 
to pay only that part of any losses insured against 
hereunder which shall exceed the amount, if any, 
lost to the Company by reason of the impairment 
of the right of subrogation. 
12. L I A B I L I T Y L IMITED TO THIS POLK 
This instrument together wi th all en,J 
ments and other instruments, if any, an . 
hereto by the Company is the entire polic, 
contract between the insured and the Com, 
Any claim of loss or damage, whether o« 
based on negligence, and which arises out u f 
status of the title to the estate or interest covt 
hereby or any action asserting such claim, shj i 
restricted to the provisions and conditions 
stipulations of this policy. 
No amendment of or endorsement to 
poiicy can be made except by wri t ing endcr 
hereon or attached hereto signed by either the Pr 
dent, a Vice President, the Secretary, an Ass.*J 
Secretary, or validating officer or authorized M. 
tory of the Company. 
13. NOTICES, WHERE SENT 
Al l notices required to be given the Con 
and any statement in wri t ing required to b 
nished the Company shall be addressed to it -
main office at 421 North Main Street, Santu 
California, or to the office which issued this pc 
870 / / ' 
Record (1 tt Requejt of_ 
at M Fee Paid %^ 
by . Dep. Book, P.ise- Kcf. 
Mail t a \ notice to_ 
_Addit u_ 
WARRANTY DEED 
GLLALDINL KESLLIU, a wcnan 
of C a s t l e Dale , Count} of I - U L / 
CONVEY and WARUAN T to 
^TC A7.1°>^'h\ 
grantor 
, St ite of Utah, hereby 
WILLIAM R. JAO SON an \ I o ROY JACKSON 
of t i l l m o r e , County of M i l l a r d , S t a t e of Ut ih for the sum of 
TEN and no/100 D o l l a r s and o t h e r yood -\nl v i l u a b l o c o n s i d e r a t i o n }J)QkbAcV,3, 
tlie following described t i -ut of land in 
State of Ut.ih. 
I i l l i i d County, 
The Southwest q u i r t o r of t h e Northc isL q u a r t e r of t h e S o u t h e a s t q u a r t e r of 
S e c t i o n 22 , Townohip 21 Sou th , Rancje 5 West, s a l t Lake Base and Mer id i an , 
( c o n t a i n i n g 10 a c r e s more o r l e s s ) 
TOGETHER WITH and SUBJECT TO a 33 foo t Lasement o v e r and across, the E a s t 
33 f e e t of s a i d p rope r ty f o r road and u t i l i t y p u r p o s e s . 
^•
/Li74MoiT^.J:> 
>W££>> 
WITNESS, the hand of said giantor , this 2J th 
September , A. D. 19 /0 
Signed in the Presence of 
G e i a l d m e K e s s l e r 
day of 
STATE OF UTAH, 
County of Emery 
On the «** £> day of 
personally appeared before me 
£V&/?<~ , A D 1970 
G e r a l d m e K e s s l e r , i woman 
the^signer /* -'of the within instrument, who duly acknowledged to me Uiat f>he executed the 
snme. , , </' 
/Jurr> ^Gvsj 
My copimission 
x s (J NoRry Public 
A, AC*. D„&. ubLl 
CLANK « lOl W A X / -y D*iO rTG CO - 3 3 5 
C?>"J 
RICHARD WADDINGHAM #4766 
WADDINGHAM & PETERSON 
Attorneys for Defendants 
36 2 West Main 
Delta, UT 84624 
(801) 864-2748 
A EX-OStlCM CLtKK of TH 
DISTRICT COURf 
H JAN 2^ 1992 |j 
MILLARD COUNTY 
ClerJ 
—— Deput; 
v»V^ 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
MILLARD COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ooOoo 
LARRY L. MOSTRONG and JENNIFER 
G. MOSTRONG, 
Plaintiffs, 
-vs« 
LEEROY JACKSON and MARGARET R. 
JACKSON, 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. 8616 
Defendants. : Honorable Cullen Y. Christensen 
ooOoo 
This matter came on duly and regularly for trial before 
the Court, the Honorable Cullen Y. Christensen presiding. The 
plaintiff appeared and was represented by counsel D. David Lambert, 
Esq. The defendant appeared and was represented by counsel Richard 
Waddingham, Esq. The Court thereupon heard the evidence adduced by 
the parties in support of their respective positions, reviewed the 
memoranda of counsel, entertained argument of counsel, considered 
the pleadings and exhibits in this matter and the Court having 
entered its Memorandum Decision dated January 2, 1992, the Court 
now enters its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law as follows: 
1 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Plaintiffs and defendants were residents of Millard 
County, State of Utah, at the time this controversy arose. 
2. On or about October 26, 1978, defendant Lee Roy 
Jackson and his brother, William Jackson, purchased certain 
property located at approximately 400 South 2588 West, Fillmore, 
Utah (hereinafter referred to as "property") from a Mrs. Geraldine 
Kessler. At the time of said purchase, defendant Lee Roy Jackson 
obtained a policy of title insurance on said property from Security 
Title Company of Fillmore, Utah. 
3. On or about November 4, 1979, a warranty deed was 
recorded in the Millard County Recorder's office whereby William 
Jackson and Lee Roy Jackson conveyed said property to Lee Roy 
Jackson and Margaret Jackson (hereinafter referred to jointly as 
"defendants"); that at said time, the only access to said property 
from a public road was to the north over a private lane approxi-
mately three-fourths of a mile in length; that said lane was 
unimproved and during inclement weather said lane was difficult to 
travel; that no one ever contested the right of defendants or 
plaintiffs to use said lane for access to the property. 
4. In approximately July, 1979, defendants constructed 
a home on said property. 
5. At the time defendants constructed the home on said 
property, there was no building code in effect in Millard County. 
The Uniform Building Code was not adopted by Millard County until 
2 
March, 1981; however, the building permit issued by Millard County 
to the defendants on July 18, 1979 provided that the construction 
must conform "to all ordinances of Millard County, laws per State 
of Utah, the Uniform Building Code, and all rules and decisions of 
the Building Inspector-"; that no final occupancy permit was sought 
by the defendants upon completion of the home; that at the time 
there was no building inspector employed by Millard County, 
6. That in 1979 defendants obtained oral permission 
from a Mr. Burdock, the owner of the land to the south of the 
subject property, to construct a lane south from the subject 
property across the Burdock land to a public road, a distance of 
approximately one-fourth of a mile; that defendant graded this lane 
and applied a cinder base thereto; that Burdock subsequently sold 
his land to Ralph G. Tuckfield; that defendants never discussed 
this lane with Tuckfield and continued to use the same without 
objection; that defendants used this south lane as a primary access 
to the subject property, but they also used the north lane for 
egress and ingress to the subject property from time to time, 
7. In July, 1987, Mostrongs (hereinafter referred to as 
"plaintiffs") entered into negotiations with defendants for the 
purchase of defendants' property. 
8. During the initial discussion between plaintiff 
Larry Mostrong and defendant Lee Roy Jackson, plaintiff offered 
defendant $55,000,00 for the property. However, defendant specifi-
cally informed plaintiff that he would not sell the property for 
3 
less than $65,000,00. Plaintiffs thereafter agreed to pay 
defendant $65,000,00 for said property. 
9. Prior to entering into an Earnest Money Agreement 
for the purchase of said property, defendant Larry Mostrong 
inspected the subject property on at least three occasions; the 
parties are in agreement that the north lane and the south lane 
were discussed on these occasions. However, plaintiffs testified 
that it was represented by defendants that while the north lane was 
available, the south lane was the primary access, that such lane 
would be there "always" and that the south lane was a private road 
which plaintiffs would have to maintain. On the other hand, the 
defendants testified that plaintiffs were informed that the north 
lane was the legal access to the subject property and that the 
south lane was for convenience only and was only a permissive use. 
The Court finds that the evidence does not preponderate in support 
of the plaintiffs' position with respect to such south lane. 
10. Plaintiffs and defendants entered into an integrated 
Earnest Money Agreement on or about July 15, 1987 for a total 
purchase price of $65,000.00. (Ex. 1.) 
11. Two appraisals were performed on the subject 
property after the Earnest Money Agreement was .signed but before 
the September 1, 1987 closing. Neither appraisal identified any 
problems concerning access to the subject property or the condition 
of the property. (Exhibits 2A and 2B) 
4 
12. At approximately the same time that the parties 
executed said Earnest Money Agreement, plaintiffs applied for a 
conventional loan through Zions First National Bank. Plaintiffs 
were unable to produce the required down payment for a conventional 
loan through Zions First National Bank and, therefore, on or about 
August 4, 1987 made application through Zions First National Bank 
for FHA financing. 
13. On August 28, 1987, Zions First National Bank, the 
parent company of Zions Mortgage Company, notified plaintiffs that 
it had turned down their application for credit on the basis of 
insufficient verification of income because Mr. Mostrong was self-
employed and had not resided in Utah for a sufficient time to 
establish his income. (Exhibit 2) However, Zions First National 
Bank specifically informed the plaintiffs that the bank would be 
willing to loan plaintiffs the necessary financing for the property 
after plaintiffs established stability of income over a two-year 
period. 
14. Both parties were still interested in completing the 
sale and the defendants stated that they would carry the financing 
on the house for two years to allow the plaintiffs to establish a 
sufficient income history and residency in Utah so as to satisfy 
such bank lending requirements for financing. Thereafter the 
parties held a closing for the sale of the property memorialized by 
a Warranty Deed, a Trust Deed Note and a Deed of Trust on September 
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1, 1981, (Exhibit 4), and plaintiffs took possession of the subject 
property. 
15. At the time of said closing, defendants conveyed by 
Warranty Deed and plaintiffs accepted only that property described 
as follows: 
The South half of the Southwest quarter of the 
Northeast quarter of the Southeast quarter of 
Section 22, Township 21 South, Range 5 West, 
Salt Lake Base and Meridian. 
Excepting therefrom h of all oil, gas and 
other minerals in on or under said land, 
together with the right of ingress and egress 
for the purpose of exploring and/or removing 
the same. 
Together with that certain underground water 
well identified as: Water User's Claim No. 
67-885, Application No. 53542, Certificate No. 
12844. 
Together with all improvements and appurte-
nances thereunto belonging. 
Subject to covenants, conditions, restric-
tions, reservations, rights of way and ease-
ments in existence and/or of record. 
Said conveyance did not specifically include any easement for 
access from the north or the south. (Exhibit 4) 
16. Upon purchasing said property, plaintiffs obtained 
a policy of title insurance on said property from Security Title 
Company of Millard County, which policy insured against lack of a 
right of access to the property. 
17. All parties reasonably believed at the time of 
closing that the only apparent obstacle to bank financing was the. 
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two-year residency for verification of plaintiffs' income. The 
parties therefore agreed in order to give plaintiffs time to 
accomplish the intended FHA or other acceptable financing to enter 
into said Note and Trust Deed as an interim measure. 
18. From the date plaintiffs signed said Trust Deed Note 
on September 1, 1987, until shortly before such Note became due in 
full on September 1, 1989, plaintiffs never made further applica-
tion for financing. At various times during this two-year period, 
plaintiff Larry Mostrong worked and lived in California. 
19. On or about September 1, 1989 plaintiff Jennifer 
Mostrong informed defendants that she had made application for an 
FHA loan through First Security Bank, which loan was expected to be 
finalized within four (4) to six (6) weeks. As a result, defen-
dants granted plaintiffs an additional three (3) months in which to 
get the FHA financing. 
20. Plaintiffs thereafter informed defendants that FHA 
had denied their loan request because of a question regarding an 
easement to the property. Plaintiffs further stated that they 
needed a "recorded easement" to the property. 
21. When plaintiffs made inquiry to defendants regarding 
a "recorded easement" to the property, defendants contacted 
Security Title Company to ascertain the status of an easement to 
the property. Security Title thereupon secured a Warranty Deed for 
the said north lane from Geraldine Kessler (prior owner of the 
servient property) to defendants and defendants conveyed said Deed 
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for Easement to the plaintiffs, which deeds were recorded on 
January 4, 1990 in the Millard County Recorder's Office. (Plain-
tiffs' Exhibit No. 37 and Defendants' Exhibit No. 41) 
22. On December 1, 1989 the defendants recorded a Notice 
of Default with respect to said Trust Deed because plaintiffs had 
failed to make the balloon payment due on September 1, 1989. 
23. Plaintiffs continued their efforts to obtain bank 
financing and on or about February 12, 1990 defendants offered to 
carry the financing until March 1, 1991 upon certain conditions 
(Plaintiffs' Exhibit No. 36). Plaintiffs declined to accept such 
conditions. 
24. A Trustee's Sale under said Trust Deed was thereupon 
scheduled April 4, 1990. On or about March 28, 1990, plaintiffs 
obtained a temporary restraining order against said sale. On or 
about April 4, 1990 the parties, through their respective counsel, 
negotiated an extension of said Trustee's Sale to May 18, 1990. On 
or about May 17, 1990 the plaintiffs paid to defendants the sum of 
$5,257.37 for back monthly payments agreed upon for plaintiffs' 
continued possession of the property and for attorney fees, costs 
and trustee fees, and defendants extended the time for the 
Trustee's Sale for an additional 60 days. (Plaintiffs' Exhibit No. 
27; Plaintiffs' Exhibit No. 28) 
25. During the interim the plaintiffs had been negotiat-
ing with Valley Central Bank to secure a loan with which to pay off 
defendants' Trust Deed. Such a loan was conditioned upon the 
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dedication of the said Tuckfield lane as a Millard County road and 
upon correction of certain perceived deficiencies in the construc-
tion of the house on the subject property. 
26. On or about May 3, 1990 plaintiffs obtained a deed 
from Tuckfield for the south access to the subject property, 
delivery of which was conditioned upon acceptance of said lane as 
a county road. (Plaintiffs' Exhibit No. 22) 
27. On or about May 15, 1990, the plaintiffs received a 
commitment from the Millard County Commission to the effect that 
the County would accept said road as a county road and would agree 
to maintain "this new and improved county road." (Exhibits Nos. 32 
and 33). The Millard County Attorney took a position that such 
acceptance was conditioned upon the lane being brought to county 
standards (Exhibits 20 and 21) but the said County Commission 
resolution did not so specifically state. The only bid for 
improving said lane was made by Reed Penny who estimated the cost 
to be from $2,200 to $2,500. Millard County Superintendent of 
Roads, Lee Roper, testified that he was not contacted by plaintiffs 
to ascertain what, if any, improvements were necessary to bring the 
lane to County standards. The defendants refused to contribute in 
any amount toward such costs. Said improvements were never made. 
Nevertheless, plaintiffs submitted the Millard County commitment to 
Valley Central Bank in support of their loan application. 
28. At the request of defendants, the Millard County 
Building official, Jerry Reagan, on or about June 27, 1990, made an 
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inspection of the house on the subject property and noted several 
deficiencies, as set forth in Plaintiffs' Exhibit No. 19; Carl 
Faulkner, a licensed contractor, called by plaintiffs testified 
that it would cost $6,085 to correct such deficiencies and that the 
same could be done within a couple of days; Butch Jensen, a 
licensed contractor, called by defendants, testified that it would 
cost $3,212 to make such repairs (Defendants' Exhibit No, 47) and 
that the same could be done in less than a week; defendants twice 
offered to pay for the cost of such repairs (Defendants' Exhibit 
Nos. 34 and 35), but no affirmative response was received from the 
plaintiffs with respect thereto. 
29. After the Deed for Easement over the Tuckfield 
property to the south was obtained, the commitment from Millard 
County to accept the same as a county road and maintain the same 
was received, and after defendants' offer to plaintiffs on two 
separate occasions to pay for the noted deficiencies in the 
construction of the house on the premises, the plaintiffs took no 
further steps to secure bank or FHA financing in order to pay off 
the said promissory note to defendants. 
30. After the said initial application for financing to 
Zions First National Bank on August 4, 1987, the plaintiffs made no 
further efforts to secure financing from that institution. 
31. Plaintiffs made no further payments on the said 
Trust Deed Note after May 17, 1990; that the substituted Trustee 
under said Deed of Trust did notice a Trustee's Sale of said 
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property for September 25, 1990 at which sale the defendants 
entered a bid of $42,000, which bid was accepted and a Trustee's 
Deed was issued to defendants for the subject property dated 
September 27, 1990. (Plaintiffs' Exhibit No- 10D) 
32. Plaintiffs did not vacate the property until on or 
about September 25, 1990; that plaintiffs did not prior to said 
date tender the subject property back to the defendants nor did 
plaintiffs notify the defendants of any intent to repudiate or 
rescind the purchase of said property. 
33. That upon retaking possession of said property on or 
about October 4, 1990, the defendants noted various items of damage 
to the subject property which defendants attributed to the 
plaintiffs (Defendants' Exhibit No. 48) The plaintiffs testified 
that they left the said property in as good or better condition 
than when plaintiffs took possession in 1987. 
34. Plaintiffs claim attorney fees in the sum of $13,736 
based upon 205.9 hours at rates varying from $75-$100 per hour. 
Counsel for plaintiff testified without contradiction that such 
rates were reasonable and consistent with charges made in this area 
for like services and that the services performed were reasonably 
necessary in the presentation of plaintiffs' case. 
Testimony was also proffered that a prior counsel for 
plaintiffs had charged plaintiffs $2,987.44 for legal services 
performed in connection with this case. No testimony was proffered 
as to the rate at which prior counsel charged for his services, nor 
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was testimony proffered as to the reasonableness of such fee or the 
necessity therefor. 
35. Defendants claim attorney fees in the sum of 
$8,391.00, as shown by affidavit submitted by counsel for defen-
dants without objection. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Based upon the foregoing, the court concludes as follows: 
1. Title to the property conveyed by defendants by 
Warranty Deed to plaintiffs on or about September 1, 1987 was 
marketable. However, no easement for access was mentioned therein. 
2. Legal access from the subject property to a public 
road was represented by the defendants to be along the lane running 
north from said property. Plaintiffs have not sustained their 
burden of proof to support their claim that defendants represented 
that there was a legal access over the lane running south from the 
subject property. 
3. Defendants did not misrepresent the condition of the 
house on said premises, plaintiffs having had adequate opportunity 
to inspect the same and having lived in the home for at least two 
years before raising any questions regarding any deficiencies in 
the construction thereof. 
4* Defendants did not make any fraudulent or negligent 
misrepresentations to the plaintiffs regarding access to said 
property or regarding the condition of the home thereon. 
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5. Access to the property from the north was insured by 
the policy of title insurance obtained by the plaintiffs. 
6. Defendants were not obligated to pursue legal access 
to the property from the south over the Tuckfield property, 
7. Bank refinancing for the money owed to defendants 
under the Note and Trust Deed was reasonably available to plain-
tiffs had they pursued the matter further, particularly in view of 
defendants' willingness to pay for the construction deficiencies 
noted by the Millard County Building official and the lending 
institution appraisers. 
8. No material mutual mistake of the parties has been 
shown by the evidence adduced by plaintiffs. 
9. No material unilateral mistake on the part of 
plaintiffs has been demonstrated sufficient to support a recision 
of the contract between the parties. 
10. In any event, any rights which plaintiffs may have 
had to recision under any state of facts was waived by the failure 
of plaintiffs to promptly notify defendants of plaintiffs' 
intention to rescind the contract and by plaintiffs' failure to 
tender back the subject property upon plaintiffs learning of the 
lack of legal access over the Tuckfield property and upon learning 
of alleged deficiencies in the construction of the house located on 
the subject property. 
11. Plaintiffs have not produced evidence to support any 
award for punitive damages against the defendants. 
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12. Neither party has shown any legal basis to support 
their respective claims for attorney fees. The plaintiffs have not 
shown sufficient evidence to support their claims, and the 
defendants having purchased the property at the said Trustee's 
Sale, the provisions for attorney fees in the Note and Trust Deed 
were thereby extinguished. 
13. Plaintiffs' complaint and all causes of action 
alleged therein should be dismissed "no cause of action." 
14. Defendants' counterclaim should be dismissed "no 
cause of action," such claims having been obviated by the Trustee's 
Sale. 
15. Each party should assume their own costs of court 
and attorney fees. 
DATED this £?^ day of January, 1992. 
^ ^ , ssUZsuZjfrzJ** 
;ULLEN Y^CHRISTENSEN 
DISTRICI^COURT JUDGE 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing Defendants' Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
to David Lambert, attorney for plaintiffs, Howard, Lewis & 
Petersen, P.O. Box 778, Provo, UT 84603, postage prepaid, this 
9*^- day of January, 1992. 
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RICHARD WADDINGHAM #4766 -.^TT^TOTV 
WADDINGHAM & PETERSON MILLARD COUNTY 
Attorneys for Defendants — — . _ — — — — C!e? 
362 West Main i ^ V . Depul 
Delta, UT 84624 
(801) 864-2748 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
MILLARD COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ooOoo 
LARRY L. MOSTRONG and JENNIFER 
G. MOSTRONG, 
JUDGMENT Plaintiffs, 
-vs-
LEEROY JACKSON and MARGARET R. 
JACKSON, : Civil No. 8616 
Defendants. : Honorable Cullen Y. Christensen 
ooOoo 
The above-entitled matter came on regularly for trial on 
October 28 and 29, 1991 before the Honorable Cullen Y. Christensen, 
District Judge, sitting at Fillmore, Millard County, Utah, and the 
trial not having been completed on that date, further evidence and 
closing arguments were heard on December 9, 1991 in Provo, Utah 
County, Utah. 
The plaintiff appeared and was represented by counsel D. 
David Lambert, Esq. The defendant appeared and was represented by 
counsel Richard Waddingham, Esq. The Court having heard testimony 
and the evidence adduced by the parties in support of their 
respective positions; having reviewed the memoranda of counsel; 
1 
having reviewed the exhibits introduced into evidence at trial; 
having heard the arguments of counsel; and having entered its 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law; 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND 
DECREED: 
1. Plaintiffs' complaint and all causes of action 
alleged therein are hereby dismissed "no cause of action". 
2. Defendants' counterclaim is hereby dismissed "no 
cause of action". 
3. Plaintiffs and defendants are each ordered to assume 
their own costs of court and attorneys' fees. 
DATED this J?ZL day of January, 1992. 
BY THE COURT: 
lULLEN Y. 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing Defendants' Judgment to David Lambert, attorney for 
plaintiffs, Howard, Lewis & Petersen, P.O. Box 778, Provo, UT 
84603, postage prepaid, this $'**' day of January, 1992. 
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County had not as of that date employed a building inspector, 
(T.225:2-25). 
As further pointed out above, Larry Mostrong's testimony 
that LeeRoy Jackson represented the home to be FHA approvable 
(T.151:6-10) is antithetical to LeeRoy Jackson's testimony that 
the only representation he made was that he had actually 
constructed the house. (T.280:15-20). 
Larry Mostrong testified that he inspected the home prior to 
purchase (T.151:4-5); that he signed an Earnest Money Agreement 
accepting the home in its present physical condition (T.151:21-
25,T.152:1-5); and that he did not enlist the help of a building 
inspector prior to purchase, (T,152:6-9). 
Nevertheless, Mostrongs resided in the home for approxi-
mately three years without any apparent difficulties with the 
structure or improvements. 
Mostrongs have not established fraudulent or negligent 
misrepresentation by "clear and convincing evidence". Modern Air 
Conditioning, Inc., at 816, 824. 
VI. MOSTRONGS HAVE FAILED TO ESTABLISH THAT THERE WAS A MATERIAL 
MUTUAL MISTAKE OF THE PARTIES REGARDING ACCESS TO THE 
PROPERTY OR CONSTRUCTION OF THE HOME. 
Mutual mistake requires that "...there is a clear bona fide 
mistake regarding material facts, without culpable negligence on 
the part of the person complaining...." Davie v. Brownson, 3 
Wash. App. 820, 478 P. 2d 258, 260 (1970) (Citing Lindberq v, 
Murray, 177 Wash, 43, 201 P.2d 759, 763 (1921)). 
A party claiming mutual mistake must show that the mistake 
involved a "material fact" and "without culpable negligence" on 
the part of the person complaining. Davie, at 260. 
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The trial court determined that "[N]o material mutual 
mistake of the parties has been shown by the evidence adduced by 
[Mostrongs]." (Conclusion No. 8, R. 523) 
Mostrongs suggest that there were clear bona fide mistakes 
regarding material facts as they related to access to the 
property and construction of the property. The issue regarding 
access has been addressed. The District Court found sufficient 
evidence to establish that there was proper legal access to the 
north lane. Furthermore, Mostrongs had possession of the 
property for approximately three years and obtained an easement 
to the south lane. 
Mostrongs assertion that there were mutual mistakes of fact 
regarding construction of the home, has no merit. Financing was 
never denied because the home did not comply with UBC standards, 
it was denied because the FHA appraiser, Joseph Stott, was 
concerned about three or four minor construction items. (T.119:5-
16; Ex. 18). Mr. Stott testified that in jurisdictions that had 
not adopted building codes, FHA has its own standards. Mr. Stott 
further testified that had the items he checked on his appraisal 
been corrected, there was nothing else he saw that would have 
been a problem. (T.125:2-25,T.126:1-2). 
There was no material mutual mistake of the parties that the 
home was built strictly in accordance with the UBC, due to the 
fact that such alleged noncompliance with the UBC had absolutely 
no bearing on Mostrongs' ability to obtain financing. In June of 
1991, Mostrongs hired a building inspector, Charles V. Hugo, and 
a contractor, Carl Faulkner, to inspect the property and estimate 
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costs of construction problems.6 (T.177:17-23). When asked which 
UBC manual he used during his inspection of the home, Mr. Hugo 
testified, "I didn't have a manual in my hand. I was going by 
past experience as an inspector and looking for, not necessarily 
code violations, but problems." (T.181:2-10). Mostrongs raised 
the issue regarding the UBC, after the fact, only in furtherance 
of their lawsuit. 
It may be expected that homes that are constructed in a 
jurisdiction that have not adopted the UBC may well have some 
construction deficiencies. However, Steve Hatch, a real estate 
appraiser with 22 years experience (T.211:4-18), when asked 
whether all homes he inspects would have to meet the UBC, 
testified, "No...obviously the older ones may not meet the most 
up-to-date codes but still, if they are reasonably accepted 
market, they are in fact financed."(emphasis added)(T.220:17-25 ) . 
Mostrongs did not meet their burden in trial court that 
there was a material mutual mistake of the parties, nor have they 
marshaled the evidence on this appeal to challenge the Court's 
determination. It is well established that: 
[t]he Appellant must marshal all the evidence 
which supports the trial court's findings and show 
that, in the light most favorable to the finding, it is 
6Timely objection (T.186:9-12) was made on the grounds of 
relevancy on Mr Hugo's and Mr. Faulkner's testimony based on the 
fact that financing was not denied on account of the UBC 
violations and that the cost of correcting the items set forth in 
such inspection exceeded the cost of those items addressed by 
Valley Central Bank as listed in the Stott Appraisal. (Ex. 18) 
Furthermore, Faulkner's estimate of corrections was approximately 
twice the amount testified to by Butch Jensen. Faulkner 
testified that he did not have experience as a building inspec-
tor, but that he took a "punch list" evaluating what he felt were 
inadequacies with regard to the home. (T.195:10-23) 
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against the "clear weight of the evidence", and is thus 
clearly erroneous when applied to the foregoing legal 
principles. 
Grahn v. Gregory, 800 P.2d 320, 327 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
VII. THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY DETERMINED THAT MOSTRONGS HAVE 
FAILED TO ESTABLISH THAT THERE WAS A MATERIAL UNILATERAL 
MISTAKE ON THEIR PART TO SUPPORT A RESCISSION OF THE 
CONTRACT BETWEEN THE PARTIES. 
Utah Courts have defined unilateral mistake as consisting of 
the following elements: 
1) The mistake must be of so grave a consequence that to 
enforce the contract as actually made would 
unconscionable• 
2) The matter as to which the mistake was made must 
relate to a material feature of the contract, 
3) Generally the mistake must have occurred notwithstand-
ing the exercise of ordinary diligence by the party 
making the mistake* 
4) It must be possible to give relief by way of rescis-
sion without serious prejudice to the other party 
except the loss of his bargain. In other words, it 
must be possible to put him in status quo. 
Mostrongs have not established that there was a mistake of 
"so grave a consequence" that to enforce the contract as actually 
made would be unconscionable, nor have Mostrongs established that 
there was a mistake of a "material" feature of the contract. 
It has been established that there was legal access from the 
property across the north lane to a public road. It has further 
been shown that Mostrongs cannot claim they exercised ordinary 
diligence in ascertaining the status of the south lane in 
determining whether a legal easement existed south of the 
property. 
Valley Central denied financing due to four minor construc-
tion deficiencies. Such noted deficiencies were not "material" 
to the contract. Mostrongs' witnessf Mr. Hugo, gave his general 
impression of the home as "nice looking" with "a few problems 
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that were correctable", and that could be fixed within a few 
days. (T.182:18-20, T.183:13-19 ) . Millard County Building 
Inspector, Jerry Reagan, testified that he could not find any 
major construction problems with the home and what he did see as 
problems were minor. (T.230:9-18).7 
Jacksons would be seriously prejudiced by a rescission of 
the contract, based on the extended time they gave Mostrongs to 
obtain financing, Mostrongs' continuous occupation of the 
property, Jacksons' lost rent and subsequent expenses in 
restoring the property. 
It is evident from the arguments made above, that there was 
not a material mistake regarding financing, lack of access or 
material structural defects of the home. 
Mostrongs fail to marshal the evidence to support the 
Court's finding and conclusion that there was no material 
unilateral mistake on the part of Mostrongs sufficient to support 
a rescission. 
VIII. THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY DETERMINED THAT BANK 
REFINANCING FOR MONEY OWED TO JACKSONS UNDER THE NOTE 
AND TRUST DEED WAS REASONABLY AVAILABLE TO MOSTRONGS 
HAD THEY PURSUED THE MATTER FURTHER, PARTICULARLY IN 
VIEW OF JACKSONS' WILLINGNESS TO PAY FOR THE CONSTRUC-
TION DEFICIENCIES NOTED BY THE MILLARD COUNTY BUILDING 
OFFICIAL AND THE LENDING INSTITUTION APPRAISERS. 
A. Mostrongs' Acquisition Of An Easement Over The South 
Lane Of The Property And Jacksons' Willingness To 
Correct The Construction Deficiencies, Guaranteed 
Mostrongs Financing. 
7Wilford Jensen's testimony establishes that the cost of 
correcting those items noted on Joseph Stott's appraisal would be 
approximately $1,348.(1.265:11-25,1-266:1-25,1:267:1-17). Fur-
thermore, Mostrongs' expert witness, Mr. Faulkner, testified it 
would take approximately one to two days to correct such 
deficiencies. (T.199:5-7). This shows that such problems were not 
"material" to the construction of the home. 
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Mostrongs submitted to Valley Central Bank in support of 
their loan application the Millard County commitment to accept 
the south lane as a county road, and testimony is unrebutted that 
access was no longer an issue to financing- (T.41:25,T.42:1-11). 
It has been shown that Valley Central Bank's refusal to 
accept the loan application was due to those minor construction 
deficiencies noted on Joseph Stott's appraisal. (T.220:17-25). 
Nevertheless, in a show of good faith, Jacksons offered to 
correct any construction deficiencies associated with the home at 
Jacksons' cost. (Exs. 34, 35;). Furthermore, Jacksons left the 
door open by stating that even though they were going forward 
with the Trustee's Sale, they would correct the construction 
deficiencies if they could get a commitment from Mostrongs for 
financing by the date of the sale. (T.288:5-18; Ex. 34, 35; 
Addendums D, E; Finding No. 28, 29, R. 525, 526). 
Jacksons never received a reply from Mostrongs to said 
offers, (T.288:5-18) nor did Mostrongs tender the property back 
to Jacksons or request a rescission of the contract. (T.289:8-
14,T.290:17-23,T.100:12-19) 
B. Mostrongs' Efforts To Obtain Financing Were Not 
Reasonable. 
The trial court's findings show that 1) Zions First National 
Bank was willing to loan the necessary financing after Larry 
Mostrong established residency and verification of income in Utah 
for two years (T.71:8-17,T.153:1-19) ; Mostrongs made no applica-
tion for financing from September 1, 1987 until approximately the 
time the Note became due on September 1, 1989 (T. 72; 7-13); 
Jacksons offered to carry financing for Mostrongs for an 
44 
additional year upon certain conditions—Mostrongs refused. (T. 
286:7-17). After all apparent impediments to financing were 
removed, Mostrongs took no further steps to obtain bank or FHA 
financing in order to pay off the Note. (The aforementioned 
facts support Finding No. 13, R. 531; Finding No. 18, R. 529; 
Finding No. 24, R. 528; and Findings No. 29 and 30, R. 526). 
Mostrongs argue that it would have been an exercise in 
futility to attempt financing before September 1, 1989, because 
of the two-year waiting period required to establish Larry 
Mostrong's residency and income verification in Utah. 
The irony in Mostrongs' argument is that, if Larry Mostrong 
was required to establish a two-year residency in Utah for 
verification of income, under no possible circumstances could 
Mostrongs ever have qualified for financing. The record is clear 
that Larry Mostrong resided in California during much of the time 
the contract was in effect and that he could not have established 
the required proof of residency and income in Utah at the time 
the Note became due. (T.73:21-25,T.74: 1-7,T.98:16-22,T.149:13-
25,T.150:1-17,T.153:2-27; Finding No. 18, R. 529). 
The cases cited by Appellants in support of this argument 
are inapposite. (Appellants' Brief P. 30). In each such case the 
prospective buyer was denied financing for "insufficient income". 
IX. THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY DETERMINED THAT ANY RIGHTS 
WHICH MOSTRONGS MAY HAVE HAD TO RESCISSION UNDER ANY STATED 
FACTS WERE WAIVED BY THE FAILURE OF MOSTRONGS TO PROMPTLY 
NOTIFY JACKSONS OF MOSTRONGS INTENTION TO RESCIND THE 
CONTRACT AND BY MOSTRONGS FAILURE TO TENDER BACK THE 
PROPERTY UPON MOSTRONGS LEARNING OF THE LACK OF LEGAL ACCESS 
OVER THE SOUTH LANE AND UPON LEARNING OF ALLEGED 
DEFICIENCIES IN THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE HOUSE LOCATED ON THE 
PROPERTY. 
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Utah law is well established as to the responsibilities of 
the party who elects to rescind a contract. In Parry v. Woodall, 
438 P. 2d 813, (1968) the Utah Supreme Court announced the 
responsibility of a party who elects rescission as a remedy. In 
ruling that a party had waived his right to rescission of the 
contract, the Court stated: "...one who claims he has been 
deceived and elects to rescind his contract by reason of fraud or 
misrepresentation of the other contracting party must act 
promptly and unequivocally in announcing his intention". 
(emphasis added) Id., at 815. 
The Court further stated: 
The law is well settled that one electing to 
rescind a contract must tender back to the other 
contracting party whatever property of value he has 
received. Woodall elected to retain possession of the 
corporate assets and to carry on the business until it 
was taken over in the receivership proceedings. We are 
of the opinion that Woodall waited too JLong, and that 
he cannot now rescind the contract. 
Id., at 815. 
Waiver has been defined as "the voluntary and intentional 
relinquishment of a known right" and may be either express or 
implied. 5 Williston on Contracts, § 678 (3rd Ed. 1961). 
Express waiver, when supported by reliance thereon, excuses non-
performance of the waived condition. 5 Williston on Contracts, § 
679 (3rd Ed. 1961); Restatement (2d) of Contract, § 84(1)(1981). 
In considering waiver of a breach of a contract condition, 
the Idaho Supreme Court stated in C.I.T. Corporation v. Hess, 395 
P.2d 471 (1964) that: 
Assuming plaintiff's breach was of a nature 
sufficient to discharge defendant's obligation to 
perform, it is well recognized that the obligation of 
a party under a bilateral contract may be recreated by 
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